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The European Conflict-of-Corporate-Laws
Revolution: Uberseering,Inspire Art and Beyond
WERNER

F. EBKE*

I. Introduction
The recent decisions of the European Court of Justice in UberseeringBV v. NCC Nordic
ConstructionBaumanagement GmbH' and Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voorAmsterdam

v. Inspire Art. Ltd.2 fundamentally changed conflicts of corporate laws within the European
Union (EU). Uberseeringand InspireArt aid in bringing to fruition the idea of jurisdictional
and regulatory competition between and among the company laws of the now twenty-five
Member States of the EU.' In Uberseering, the Court recognized the right of a corporation
formed in an EU Member State to move its principal place of business or "real seat" (si~ge
ridel or effektiver Verwaltungssitz) from its state of incorporation to another EU Member
State without losing its legal status as corporate entity under the law of its state of incorporation.4 In InspireArt, the Court put an end to attempts by the legislature of the Netherlands to impose certain legal obligations on corporations that were incorporated in another Member State but carry on their business activities exclusively, or almost exclusively,
in the Netherlands (pseudo-foreign corporations).' Obviously, both judgments of the Eu*Professor of Law and Director of the Institute of German and European Corporate and Business Law,
University of Heidelberg; Global Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; Member, New York
Bar. The article is based on the Annual Lecture in International and Comparative Law delivered by the author
at the British Institute of International and Comparative Law in London on June 24, 2004.
1. Case C-208/00, (Iberseering BV v. NCC Nordic Construction Baumanagement GmbH, 2002 E.C.R.
1-9919 [2002].
2. Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art. Ltd., 2003 E.C.R.
__ (forthcoming), [2003] 56 NEUE JURISSCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 3331 availableat http://www.curia.
eu.int (last visited July 29, 2004).
3. For a detailed exposition of jurisdictional and regulatory competition of company laws in the European
Union, see KLAus HEINE, REGULIERUNGSWETrTBEWERB DER GESELLSCHAFTSRECHTSORDNUNGEN (2004); KONRAD
KERN, UBERSEERING-REHTSANGLEICHUNG

IIND GEGENSEITIGE ANERKENNUNG (2004); EvA-MARIA KIENINGER,

BINNENMARKT (2002); Christian Kirchner, Zur
WETrBEWERB DER PRIVATRECHTSORDNUNGEN IM EUROPAISCHEN

Okonomie des legislatorischen Wettbewerbs im europiiscben Gesellschaftsrecht, FESTscHR1FT FOR ULRICH IMMENGA
607 (Andreas Fuchs ed., 2004); Werner F. Ebke, Unternebmensrecbtund Binnenmarkt-E pluribusunum?, 62
RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT [RABELSZ]

4. Case C-208/00, 2002 E.C.R. at 1-9919.
5. Case C-167/01, 56 NJW at 3331.

195, 207-16 (1998).

814

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

ropean Court of Justice will have far-reaching implications not only in the EU Member
States that traditionally have applied the restrictive "real seat" doctrine, 6 but also for corporations formed in countries other than EU Member States.
Thus, for example, the question arises whether and to what extent the principles established by the European Court of Justice in Oberseering7 and Inpire Art' are applicable to
corporations formed in a Member State of the European Economic Area (EEA).9 Similarly,
it is questionable whether the same or similar principles should also be applied to companies
incorporated in a country, other than an EU or EEA Member State, that has concluded

and ratified a Friendship Treaty, Treaty of Establishment, or similar international treaty
with an EU Member State.' 0 International treaties of this nature often accord corporations

that are formed in a contracting state the "right of establishment" or similar privileges, or
they provide for "national treatment" or a "most-favored-nation treatment."" Finally, one

needs to address the question of whether the principles established by the European Court
of Justice in Uberseering5 and Inspire Art'3 should also be applied, as a matter of policy or
for reasons of efficiency, to corporations from countries other than EU Member States,
14
EEA Member States, and Treaty States.
Within the EU, berseering'" and Inspire Art16 give rise to a number of equally serious
and largely unresolved questions. Uberseeringonly dealt with the issue of whether a Member
State is required, under articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty, 7 to recognize a corporation
that was incorporated in another Member State and that has transferred, or is considered
by the former Member State to have transferred, its real seat, principal place of business,
or center of administration (centre d'administration)to its territory ("immigration" or "entry"
case).'" The Court did not have to address the question of whether the state of incorporation
may impose restrictions on a domestic corporation that intends to move its real seat, principal place of business, or center of administration from its state of incorporation to another
EU Member State ("emigration" or "exit" case). 19 In this regard, the significance of the
Court's holdings in The Queen v. H.M. Treasuryand Commissionersof InlandRevenue, exparte
Daily Mail and General Trust PLC 5 is still open to questions.2' Similarly, the Court has not

6. For details of the "real seat" doctrine, see infra notes 40-45 & 51-57.
7. Case C-208/00, 2002 E.C.R. at 1-9919.
8. Case C-167/01, 56 NJWat 3331.
9. See infra note 256 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 258-274 and accompanying text.
11.See infra note 261 and accompanying text.
12. Case C-208/00, 2002 E.C.R. at 1-9919.
13. Case C-167/01, 56 NJ' at 3331.
14. See infra notes 290-301 and accompanying text.
15. Case C-208/00, 2002 E.C.R. at 1-9919.
16. Case C-167/01, 56 NJWat 3331.
17. See TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, THE TREATIES ESTABLISHING
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN RELATED AcTs, OCT. 2, 1997, Oj. EC (C 340) 43 (hereinafter EC
TREATY]. For the text of EC Treaty articles 43 and 48, see infra notes 56 & 57.
18. See Werner F.Ebke, U'berseering:"Die wa/re LiberalitdttisAnerkennung,"58JURISTEN-ZEITUNG[JZ]927,
932 (2003); Harald Kallmeyer, Tragweite des iberseering-Urteisdes EuGH vom 5.11.2002 zurgrenziberschreitenden Sitzverlegung, 55 DER BETRIEB [DB] 2521 (2002).
19. Ebke, supra note 18, at 932. For details, see infra notes 103-120 and accompanying text.
20. Case C-81/87, The Queen v. H.M. Treasury and Commissioners of nland Revenue, exparte Daily Mail
and General Trust PLC, 1988 E.C.R. 5483.
21. See infra notes 103 -108 and accompanying text.
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yet had the opportunity to rule on the cross-border transfer of a corporation's registered
2'
office (Satzungssitz).
3
InspireArt, too, raises a number of difficult issues. Thus, for instance, courts, legislators,
and commentators are debating whether it may be justifiable, under the "four-factor test"
24
of Gebhard v. Consiglio dell' Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratoridi Milano and Centros Ltd. v.
25
requirements of its
legal
Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, for an EU Member State to impose
domestic law (e.g., capitalization requirements, stakeholder laws, or rules concerning labor
representation on the board of directors) on a corporation that was formed in another EU
Member State but has its real seat, center of administration, or principal place of business
26
in the former Member State. Also, it is questionable what effects laws such as the English
27
law on wrongful trading and the Directors' Disqualification Act" may have in light of
Uberseering9 and InspireArt.'
The present article does not intend to provide answers to all of these questions. Rather,
the article focuses primarily upon the effects, both actual and potential, of the judgments
of the European Court of Justice in (Iberseering and InspireArt. For this purpose, the article
first casts some light on the background and the holdings of the Court in Uberseeringand
Inspire Art.3' In the next section, the article explores some of the legal and economic implications of the two decisions for corporations formed in countries other than EU Member
States.3" Following the legal and economic exploration, the article addresses fundamental
policy considerations to cope with the situation created by (ilberseeringand Inspire Art."
II. U0berseering
Uberseering concerns the recognition by one Member State of a corporation incorporated
34
under the law of another Member State.

22. For details of the cross-border transfer of the registered office, see infra notes 109-120 and accompanying
text.
23. Case C-167/01, 56 NJW at 3331.
24. Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell' Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano, 1993 E.C.R.
1-4165.
25. Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. 1-1459. For details of the
four-factor test in the context of EC Treaty, see infra notes 194-197 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 218-251 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 162-163 and accompanying text.
28. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
29. Case C-208/00, 2002 E.C.R. at 1-9919.
30. Case C-167/01, 56 NJW at 3331.
31. See infra notes 34-213 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 2 14-251 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 252-301 and accompanying text.
34. Case C-208/00, 2002 E.C.R. at 1-9919. For details of the 0berseering decision in English, see, e.g., Kilian
Baelz & Teresa Baldwin, The End of the Real Seat Theoy (Siztheorie): The European Court ofJustice Decision in
L.J. 1 (2002);
Uberseeringof 5 November 2002 and Its Impact on German and European Company Law, 3 GERmosso
Luca Cerioni, The "Oberseering" Ruling: The Eve of a "Revolution" for the Possibilitiesof Companies' Migration
Throughout the European Community?, 10 CoLuM. J. EuR. L. 117 (2003); Peter Dyrberg, Full Free Movement of
Companies in the European Community at Last?, 28 ER. L. REv. 528 (2003); Eva Micheler, Recognition of Companies
Incorporated in Other EU Member States, 52 I.C.L.Q. 521 (2003); Stephan Rammeloo, The Long and Winding
Road Towards Freedom of Ettablisbmentfor Legal Personsin Europe, 10 iN.ASTRICHTJ. EuR. & COMP. L 169 (2003);
Wulf-Henning Roth, From Centros to Uberseering: Free Movement of Companies, Private InternationalLaw, and
Community Law, 52 I.C.L.Q. 177 (2003); Frank Wooldridge, Uberseering:Freedom of Establishmentof Companies
Affirmed, 14 EUR. Bus. L. REv. 227 (2003). For further references, see infra note 83.
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FACTS

In October 1990, Qberseering B.V, a closely-held corporation incorporated under the
law of the Netherlands, acquired a piece of land in Disseldorf, Germany, which it used for
business purposes. By a project-management contract dated November 27, 1992, U0berseering engaged Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH (NCC), a
closely-held corporation formed in the Federal Republic of Germany, to refurbish a garage
and a motel on the site. The contractual obligations were performed, but tOberseering B.V
claimed that the paint work was defective. In December 1994, two German citizens residing
in Disseldorf, Germany, acquired all of the shares in Uberseering B.V Uberseering B.V
unsuccessfully sought compensation from NCC for the defective work. In 1996, Oberseering brought a lawsuit against NCC in the Landgericht (District Court) of Disseldorf
for actual and consequential damages, on the basis of the project-management contract
with NCC.35 The Landgericht dismissed the action as inadmissible. The Oberlandesgericht
(Court of Appeals), Diisseldorf, upheld the decision to dismiss the action.36 The Court held
that Uberseering B.V had transferred its real seat (effektiver Verwaltungssitz)from the Netherlands to Disseldorf once the shares had been acquired by the two German nationalsY
In accordance with the settled case law of the Bundesgerichtshof5 " Germany's highest court
in civil matters, the Court of Appeals found that as a corporation incorporated under the
law of the Netherlands but having its real seat in Germany, Oiberseering B.V lacked legal
personality (Rechtsfdhigkeit) in Germany. Consequently, it did not have the capacity to bring
a lawsuit (Parteifahigkeit),as a Dutch corporate entity, in a German court.3 9 Uberseering
appealed to the Bundesgerichtshofagainst the judgment of the Court of Appeals, Diisseldorf.
B.

THE "REAL SEAT" DOCTRINE

The holding of the Court of Appeals, Diisseldorf, is based on a conflict-of-corporatelaws principle commonly referred to as the real seat doctrine or Sitztheorie.40
1. Background

The Sitztheorie, like other variations of the real seat doctrine, recognizes that only one
state should have the authority to regulate a corporation's internal affairs, while the most
plausible state to supply that law is the state in which the corporation has its real seat

35. See Judgment of Nov. 5, 1997 (Docket No. 5 0 132/96), Landgericht (District Court), Diisseldorf,
Germany (unpublished).
36. SeeJudgment of Sept. 10, 1998, Oberlandesgericht (Court of Appeals), Diisseldorf, Germany, 55JZ 203
(2000). For a detailed discussion of this decision, see Werner F. Ebke, Anmerkung, 55 JZ 203 (2000).
37. Judgment of Sept. 10, 1998, sllpra note 36, 55 JZ at 203 (2000).
38. For a comprehensive analysis of the pertinent case law, see Werner F. Ebke, Das InternationaleGesellschafcsrecht und der Bundesgerichtshof 50JAHRE BUNDESGERICHTSHOF: FESTGABE AUSDER WISSENSCHAFT 799, 80620 (Claus-Wilhelm Canaris et al. eds., 2000).
39. Judgment of Sept. 10, 1998, supra note 36, 55 JZ at 203 (2000) (referring to section 50(1) of the German
Rules of Civil Procedure [Zivilprozessordnung]). For further details of section 50(1), see infra note 75.
40. For a comparative analysis of the real seat doctrine, see Werner F. Ebke, Tbe"Real Seat" Doctrinein the
Conflict of CorporateLaws, 36 INT'L LAW. 1015 (2002). See I Vanessa Edwards, EC COMPANY LAW 336 (1999).
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41
(effektiver Verwaltungssitz or si ge rjeo. The German Supreme Court construed the term

real seat as the place where "the fundamental business decisions by the managers are being
implemented effectively into day-to-day business activities. ' 42 The real seat doctrine is based
upon the assumption that the state in which a corporation has its real seat is typically the
state that is most strongly affected by the activities of the company, and therefore, should
have the power to govern the internal affairs of that corporation. 43 The real seat doctrine
stresses the importance of uniform treatment by requiring that all corporations having their
real seat in a particular state be incorporated under that state's law. Thereby, the real seat
doctrine creates a level playing field and prevents companies from evading that state's legal
controls through incorporation in a jurisdiction that has less stringent laws." As a result,
under the Sitztheorie, all corporations concerned are subject to the same rules and principles
of corporate law and related laws, including laws that 4aim specifically at protecting shareholders, creditors, employees, and other stakeholders. 1
2. State-of-IncorporationDoctrine by Comparison

Obviously, the approach of the real seat doctrine is fundamentally different from the one
employed by English, Danish, Dutch, Italian, and Swiss courts, and, of course, by courts
in the United States of America.46 For example, under the laws of the Netherlands, Great
Britain, and the fifty states of the United States of America, incorporators are free to choose
the state of incorporation. 47 According to the choice-of-corporate-law principles of these
countries, the existence of a company, as well as its subsequent dissolution, are governed
by the law of the state of incorporation (state-of-incorporation doctrine or Griindungstheorie). The importance of the law of the state of incorporation is greatly enhanced by the fact
that the law of the state of incorporation also applies, with rare exceptions, to the "internal
affairs" of the corporation, that is, the relationship among a corporation and its officers,
directors, and shareholders. 4" Obviously, the state-of-incorporation doctrine emphasizes, as
49
a general rule, the incorporators' freedom to choose the proper law of corporation. Thus,

41. Ebke, supra note 40, at 1027.
42. See Judgment of Mar. 21, 1986, Bundesgerichtshof (Supreme Court), Germany, 97
DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFS IN ZIVILSACHEN

ENTSCHEIDUNGEN

[BGHZ] 269, 272 (1986). In determining the location of the real

seat of a corporation, courts look at several factors. For details, see, e.g., Stephan Travers,
ANKNUPFUNGSMnTERIUMS

"TATSACHLICHER

SITZ

DER HAUPTVERWALTUNG"

IM

DER BEWEIS DES

INTERNATIONALEN GESELL-

(1998); Riidiger Werner, DER NACHWEIS DESVERWALTUNGSSITZES AUSLANDISCHERJURISTISCHER
PERSONEN(1998); Markus Kieser, DIE TYPENVERMISCHUNG OER DIE GRENZE 22-105 (1988); Daniel Zimmer,
SCHAFTSRECHT

Von Debraco bis DaimlerChrysler:Alte und neue Scbwierigkeiten bei der internationalgesellscbaftsrecbtlicbenSitzbestimmung, in Richard M. Buxbaum, CORPORTIONS, CAPITAIL MARKETS AND BUSINESS IN THE LAW. LIBER AMICORUm, 654, 658-67 (Theodor Baums et al. eds., 2000); Christoph von der Seipen, Zur Bestimmungdeseffektiven
Verwatungssitzes im internationalen Gesellscbaftsrecht, 6 PRAXIlSDES INTERNATIONLANE PRIVAT- UND VERFAHENSREcHTS [IPRAx] 91 (1986).

43. See Bernhard Grossfeld,

PR.Xs DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT- UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHTS: RECHTSPROBnote 40, at 1027.
46 (1975); Ebke, supra

LEME MULTINATIONALER UNTERNEHMEN

44. Ebke, supra note 40, at 1027-28.
45. Id. at 1028.
46. Id. at 1016.

47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See

FRANKLIN

PRIVATRECHT

A.

GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAw

35-6 (2000);

BERND VON HOFFMANN, INTERNATIONALES

258-59 (6th ed., 2000).
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the lex societatis, or in the language of English law the lex dornicilii, is the result of the
incorporators' own volition. Moreover, the state-of-incorporation doctrine grants corporations the right, in principle, to move their center of administration, or principal place of
business, across state borders without any effect on their legal status as a corporate entity
under the law of the state of incorporation; provided, the registered office (Satzungssitz)
remains in the state of incorporation. 0
3. Policy
Clearly, states that apply the Sitztheorie aim at effectuating material legal, economic, and
social values of the country having the most significant relationship with a particular company.5 States that recognize a political, or even a constitutional need to protect certain
interests (such as the interests of minority shareholders, employees, creditors, or other
stakeholders; especially in the context of large, public corporations) will favor the real seat
doctrine."s In contrast, states that support the idea of party autonomy in corporate law
matters will, at least in principle, favor the state-of-incorporation rule or similar choice-ofcorporate-law principles. 3 If viewed from this perspective, conflict-of-corporate-laws rules
are, to some extent, a reflection of the general attitude of a legal culture towards the socioeconomic role of (large, publicly-held) corporations. The function of the substantive and
procedural rules of the law of corporations are to protect and further the multifarious, and
sometimes hard to reconcile, interests of managers, shareholders, stakeholders, and affili54
ated companies.
For purposes of comparative analyses, it is important to keep in mind that conflict-ofcorporate-laws rules, like other legal institutions of all legal systems, are shaped not
only by efficiency, but also by history and politics." Initial conditions, determined by
the accident of history or the design of politics, influence the path that a conflict-oflaws rule will take. In the EU, path dependency, or institutional persistence, is, however, not the only force influencing the direction and objectives of a Member State's
conflict-of-corporate-laws rules. Rather, the conflict-of-corporate-laws principles of a
Member State, like complementary institutions (e.g., pseudo-foreign corporation laws,
outreach laws, insolvency laws, or tort liability rules) that aim at enhancing the preexisting conflict-of-corporate-laws rules, need to be in compliance with the supreme law

50. For details of the cross-border transfer of the registered office, see infra notes 109-120 and accompanying
text.
51. Ebke, supra note 40, at 1028.
52. See BERNHARD GROSSFELD, INTERNATIONALES UND EUROPXISCHES UNTERNEHMENSRECHT 51-3 (2nd ed.
1995); JAN KROPHOLLER, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 562-63 (5th ed., 2004); EUGENE F. SCOLES, ET AL.,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 1103 (3d ed., 2000); KURT SIEHR, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 308 (2001).

53. Bernhard Grossfeld, Commentary, JULIUS VON STAUDINGER, KOMMENTAR ZUM BRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH MiT EINFiOHRUNGSGESETZ urND NEBENGESETZEN: INTERNATIONALES GESELLSCHAFTSREcHT 6 (13th ed.,
1998); SIEHR, supra note 52, at 308.
54. For a more detailed exposition of this view, see BERNHARD GROSsFELD, ZAURER
DES RECHTs 15-26 (1999),
See generally, Bernhard Grossfeld & Werner F. Ebke, Controlling the Modern Corporation:A Comparative View
of CorporatePower in the United States and Europe, 26 AM. J. COMp. L. 397 (1978).
55. For the historical and political background of the real seat doctrine and the "recognition" of foreign
corporations, see Bernhard Grossfeld, Zur Gescbicbte der Anerkennungsproblematik bei Aktiengesellschaften, 38
RARELSZ

344 (1974).
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REFERENCE FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING

In the iberseering case, the German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshoj) was uncertain
about the impact of freedom of establishment guaranteed by articles 43 and 48 of the EC
Treaty on Germany's basic conflict-of-corporate-laws principle, the Sitztheorie.
1. Questions
While it considered it preferable, in view of the current state of community law in general,
and of company law within the EU, in particular, to continue to follow the judge-made
Sitztheorie, Germany's Supreme Court wondered whether the freedom of establishment
granted by articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty precluded application of the Sitztheorie in
9
58
the case at hand. In light of the judgment of the European Court ofJustice in Daily Mail,
some commentators had argued that articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty require that the
60
real seat doctrine be put to rest. To these authors, the "expulsion of the seat doctrine from
6
Europe" seemed to be inevitable after Daily Mail. ' Other commentators, however, shared
the then prevailing view among German legal scholars that Daily Mail did not deal with
the impact of freedom of establishment on the factors used by the courts of EU Member

56. Article 43 of the EC Treaty reads as follows:
Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on the freedom of establishment of
nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State shall be prohibited. Such prohibition shall also apply to restrictions on the setting up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of anyMember State established in the territory of anyMember State. Freedom of establishment
shall include the right to take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons and to set up and
manage undertakings, inparticular companies or firms within the meaning of the second paragraph of
[a]rticle 48, under the conditions laid down for its own nationals by the law of the country where such
establishment is effected, subject to the provisions of the Chapter relating to capital.
note 17, art. 43.
EC TREATY, supra
57. Article 48 of the EC Treaty reads as follows:
Companies and firms formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and having their registered
office, central administration or principal place of business within the Community shall, for the purposes of this Chapter, be treated in the same way as natural persons who are nationals of Member
States. "Companies or firms" means companies or firms constituted under civil or commercial law,
including cooperative societies, and other legal persons governed by public or private law, save for
those which are non-profit-making.
EC TREATY, supra note 17, art. 48.
58. Cf Decision (Beschluss) of Mar. 30, 2000, Bundesgerichtshof (Supreme Court), Germany, 46 RECHT
DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT [RIW] 555, 556 (2000).
Daily
59. Case C-81/87, (The Queen v. H.M. Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenue), exparte
e.g., EDWARDS,
Mail and General Trust PLC, 1988 E.C.R. 5483. For details of the Daily Mail decision, see,
supra note 40, at 376-83; Werner F. Ebke & Markus Gockel, European Corporate Law, 24 Ir'L LAw 239
(1990).

60. See, e.g., Brigitte Knobbe-Keuk, Umzug von Gesellscaften in Europa, 154 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR DAS GESAMTE
[ZHRI 325, 356 (1990); Ulrich Drobnig, Gemeinschaftsrechtund internationalesGesellschaftsrecbt: "Daily Mail" und die Folgen, EUROPXISCHES GEMEINSCHAFTSRECtrt UND INTERNATONALES PRIVATRECHT 185, 195-96 & 206 (C. von Bar ed. 1991); C. voN BAR & PETER MANKOWSKI, INTERHANDELSRECHT trND WIRTSCHAFrsREcHT

140 (2003).
61. Knobbe-Keuk, supra note 60, at 356.

NATIONALES PRIVATRECHT
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States to determine the law governing the existence, dissolution, and internal affairs of
corporations (lex societatis). 62 In Daily Mail, the European Court ofJustice concluded that a
Member State was able, in the case of a company incorporated under its law, to make the
company's right to retain its legal status under the law of that State subject to restrictions
6
on the transfer of the company's actual center of administration to another Member State. 1
The Daily Mail Court did not rule on the question of whether a Member State (Member
State A) may refuse to recognize the legal personality which a company enjoys under the
laws of another Member State (Member State B), its state of incorporation, where, as in
Uberseering, the company was found by the courts of Member State A to have transferred
its real seat to its territory.64

In the opinion of the German Supreme Court, the judgment of the European Court of
Justice in Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen65 was not on point either.6 In Centros,

the Court took exception to a Danish authority's refusal to register a branch of a company
validly incorporated in the United Kingdom. In light of the then prevailing opinion among
legal scholars in Germany, 67 the German Supreme Court noted, however, that the company
in Centros had not transferred its seat to Denmark, since, from its incorporation, its registered office had been in the United Kingdom, while its principal place of business, or real
seat, had been in Denmark. 6s Thus, the German Supreme Court seems to have been of the
opinion that the European Court of Justice in Centros addressed an issue of a so-called
secondary establishment, that is, the right, under article 43(1) of the EC Treaty, of a corporation formed in one Member State to set up an agency, a branch, or a subsidiary in
another Member State, rather than the primary freedom of establishment, that is, the right
to transfer the corporation's principal place of business or center of administration to another Member State without losing its legal status under the law of the state of incorporation. 69 Consequently, in a March 30, 2000 decision, the Seventh Chamber (Zivilsenat)of

62. See, e.g., UWE EYLES, DAS NIEDERLASSUNGSRECHT DER KAPITALGESELLSCHAFTEN IN DER EUROPAIscHEN
GEMEINSCHAFT 352 (1990); Wulf-Henning Roth, DerEinflufl des Europiiischen GemeinschaftsrechtsaufdasInternationale Privatrecht, 55 RABELsZ 623, 650 (1991); GROSSFELD, supra note 52, at 122; Ebke & Gockel, supra

note 59, at 250.
63. In Daily Mail, a company formed in accordance with the law of the United Kingdom and having both
its registered office and actual center of administration there, wished to transfer its center of administration to
the Netherlands without losing its legal personality or ceasing to be a company incorporated under English
law. The transfer required the consent of the competent authorities of the United Kingdom, which they refused
to give. The company initiated proceedings against the authorities before the High Court of Justice, Queen's
Bench Division, seeking an order that articles 52 and 58 (now 43 and 48] of the EC Treaty gave it the right
to transfer its actual center of administation to another Member State without prior consent and without loss
of its legal personality.
64. Cf. Case C-208/00, 2002 E.C.R. at 1-9968 $ 71.
65. C-212/97, 1999 E.C.R. at 1-1459. For details of the Centros decision, see, e.g., Werner F. Ebke, CentrosSome Realities and Some Mysteries, 48 Ass. J. Comp. L. 623 (2000); Eddy Wymeersch, Centros:A Landmark
Decision in European Company Law,

CORPORATIONS,

CAPITAL

MARKETS AND BUSINESS IN THE

LAW. LIRER AMI-

CORUM RicHARD M. BUXBAUM 629 (Theodor Baums et al. eds., 2000).
66. Decision (Beschluss) of Mar. 30, 2000, supra note 58, 46 RIW at 557 (2000).
67. See, e.g., vow BAR & MANKowsxI, supranote 60, at 141; Werner F. Ebke, DasSchicksal der Sitztheorie nach
dam Centros-Urteildes EuGH, 54 JZ 656, 659 (1999). But see Note, European Company Law After Centros: Is the
EU on the Road to Delaware?, 8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 323, 329 (2002).
68. Decision (Beschluss) of Mar. 30, 2000, supra note 58, 46 RIW at 557 (2000).
69. For a thoughtful discussion of the case law of the European Court of Justice relating to secondary
establishments, see EDWARDS, supra note 40, at 342-62.
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the German Supreme Court referred two questions to the European Court of Justice for a
70
preliminary ruling:
(A) Are articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty to be interpreted to mean that the freedom
of establishment of companies precludes the legal personality and capacity to be a
party to legal proceedings, of a company validly incorporated under the law of one
Member State from being determined according to the law of another State to which
the company has moved its actual center of administration, where, under the law of
that second Member State, the company may no longer bring legal proceedings there
in respect of claims under a contract?
(B) If the Court's answer to that question is affirmative: Does the freedom of establishment of companies (articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty) require that a company's
legal personality and the capacity to conduct litigation be determined according to
the law of the State where the company is incorporated?
2. Criticism
The decision of the Seventh Chamber of the German Supreme Court to submit these
questions to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling met substantial opposition. Several German commentators criticized the reference to the European Court of
7
Justice, which, as was pointed out by Justice Reinhold Thode at a conference in December
72
2002, the reference was necessary and correct. Other authors argued that the Seventh
7
Chamber's request for a preliminary ruling became "superfluous" after the German Su-

70. Cf Case C-208/00, 2002 E.C.R. at 1-9951 J21. The right of the European Court of Justice to give
preliminary rulings is based on article 234 of the EC Treaty. This provision reads as follows:
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning:
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community and of the ECB
[European Central Bank];
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the Council, where those
statutes so provide.
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal
may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request
the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon. Where any such question is raised in a case pending
before a court or tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under
national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court of Justice.
See EC TREATY, supra note 17, art. 234.
71. See, e.g., Peter Behrens, Reaktionen mitgliedstaatlicherGerichteaufdas Centros-Urteildes EuGH, 20 IPRAx
384, 388 (2000); see I Curt C. von Halen, Der Streit um die Sitztbeorie vor der Entscheidung?, 13 EUROPAISCHES
WIRTscHAFTs- UtD STEtJERRECHT [EWS] 107, 111-12 (2002).

72. Justice Thode's statements are reported in Markus Rehberg, InternationalesGesellscbaftsrecbtim Wandel:
Das Oberseering-Urteildes EuGH und seine Folgen (TagungsbericbO,23 IPRAx 230, 235-36 (2003).
73. See, e.g., Ulrich Forsthoff, EuGHfdrdert Vielfalt im Gesellschaftsrecht:Traditionelledeutsche Sitztheorie verstbfltgegen Niederlassungsreieit,55 DB 2471, 2471 (2002) (arguing that the Seventh Chamber of the German
Supreme Court should have withdrawn its reference for a preliminary ruling of the European Court ofJustice).
See also Ulrich Forsthoff, Abschied von der Sitztbeorie:Anmerkungen zu den Schlussantragendes GA Ddmaso RuizJarabo Colomer in der Rs. Uberseering, 57 BETRIEBs-BERATER [BBI 318, 321 (2002); Holger Altmeppen, Parteifdhigkeit, Sitztbeorie und "Centros," 38 DEUTCcEs STEUERRECHT [DSTR] 1061 (2000).
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preme Court's Jersey decision of July 1, 2002.14 In order to prevent the European Court of
Justice from ruling in the Uberseeringcase and to save the life of the German version of the
real seat doctrine (Sitztbeorie), the Second Chamber of the German Supreme Court (which
generally hears corporate law cases) held in Jersey that a limited company incorporated
under the law of the Channel Island of Jersey, having its real seat (effektiver Verwaltungssitz)

in Germany, was to be recognized in Germany, not as a Jersey corporation, but as a German
Gesellschaft biirgerlichenRechts (GbR), an unincorporated private association.7" According to

recent case law of the Second Chamber of the German Supreme Court, a GbR has the
capacity to sue and be sued in its own name.76 The authors overlooked, however, the fact
that companies formed under the law of the Channel Island of Jersey cannot invoke the
benefits of the freedom of establishment guaranteed by articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty
because of a reservation filed by the United Kingdom in connection with its accession to
the EU.77 Consequently, the Supreme Court's ruling in Jersey could not render the issue
submitted by the Seventh Chamber to the European Court ofJustice in Uberseering,moot.
Furthermore, the commentators completely ignored the fact that if the Jersey rule, were
applied to corporations that may invoke freedom of establishment guaranteed by articles
43 and 48 of the EC Treaty, the rule would be incompatible with articles 43 and 48 of the
EC Treaty. The Jersey rule makes the freedom of establishment less attractive without any

74. Judgment of July 1, 2002, Bundesgerichtshof (Supreme Court), Germany, 151 BGHZ 204 (2002). For
details of theersey decision, see, e.g., Stefan Leible &Jochen Hoffmann, Vom "Nullum"zurPersonengesellscbaftDie Metamorphose der Scheinauslandsgesellschaftim deutschen Recht, 55 DB 2203 (2002).
75. Members of the Second Chamber of the German Supreme Court, in particular Justices Hartwig Henze
and Wulf Goette, have made no secret of the fact that the Jersey decision, supra note 74, was intended by the
Second Chamber to render the freedom-of-establishment issue in Uberseering moot in order to prevent the
European Court of Justice from issuing a judgment in Oberseering and thereby to save the life of the German
real seat doctrine. See Hartwig Henze, Europiiiscbes Gesellschaftsrechtin der Rechtsprecbungdes Bundesgerichtshofs,
56 DB 2159, 2164 (2003); Wulf Goette, Anmerkung, 40 DSTR 1679, 1680 (2002). The European Court of
Justice has consistently refused to rule on issues that are technically moot. See Ebke, supra note 65, at 645. See
also infra note 171 and accompanying text. Thus, the Second Chamber's idea seems to have been to render
moot the issues submitted by the Seventh Chamber to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling
by according (Tberseering B.V., the Dutch corporation, the right to be a party to legal proceedings in Germany,
albeit not as a Dutch corporation but as a German GbR. See Judgment of July 1, 2002, supra note 74. The
dispute between the Second Chamber and the Seventh Chamber of the German Supreme Court arose because
the Second Chamber, which normally hears corporate law cases, was apparently not willing to request a preliminary ruling from the European Court ofJustice as to the compatibility of the real seat doctrine with articles
43 and 48 of the EC Treaty. Under the Supreme Court's rules, the Second Chamber could not demand,
however, that the Seventh Chamber, which normally hears construction law cases, transfer the case to the
Second Chamber. For, the issue of whether U.berseering B.V., as a Dutch corporation, could be a party to
legal proceedings in Germany was a question of procedural law rather than of the merits of tilberseering's case.
See Ebke, supra note 65, at 654. Section 50(1) of the German Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung)
provides that an action brought by a party who does not have the capacity to conduct litigation (Parteifdhigkeit)
must be dismissed as inadmissible. Id. A business association has the capacity to be a party to legal proceedings
if it has legal personality (Rechtsfahigkeit). Legal personality is defined as the capacity to enjoy rights and to be
the subject of obligations. Cf Ebke, supra note 36, at 204. According to settled case law of the Bundesgerichtsbof
Germany's highest court in civil law matters, a foreign company's legal personality is determined by reference
to the real seat doctrine (Sitztheorie).According to this doctrine, a corporation that has been validlyincorporated
in another EU Member State but has subsequently transferred, or is considered under the German version of
the real seat doctrine to have transferred, its actual center of administration or principal place of business (real
seat or effektiver Verwaltungssitz) to Germany is not recognized as having legal personality (Rechtsfdhigkeit). Id.
76. Ebke, supra note 18, at 928.
77. Id.
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justification on the grounds set forth in both article 46 of the EC Treaty and the four-factor
79
8
test of Gebhard and Centros. Specifically, under the Jersey rule, a foreign corporation is
treated, for purposes of domestic law, as a GbR, which creates unforeseeable and unwarranted risks, including the risk of unlimited personal liability of its members. 8° In addition,
the Jersey rule gives rise to numerous issues of substantive and procedural law. For example,
it is unclear whether, as a defendant in a law suit before a court in Germany, the foreign
corporation that is treated by German conflict-of-corporate-laws rules as a GbR, may bring
a counter claim that the foreign corporation claims to have against the plaintiff.8" Finally,
the recognition and enforcement of a judgment handed down by a German court against
the foreign corporation would, of course, give rise to extremely complicated issues. 82
D. THE JUDGMENT
The European Court ofJustice ignored the distraction efforts and the harassing fire from
Germany. On November 5, 2002, the Court decided that Uberseering B.V., which was
validly incorporated, and had its registered office in the Netherlands, was entitled, under
articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty, to exercise its freedom of establishment in Germany
as a company incorporated under the law of the Netherlands. 3

1. Immigration
According to the Court, the lower German courts' refusal to recognize the legal personality of Uberseering B.V as a corporate entity, incorporated under the law of the Netherlands, on the ground that the corporation had effectively transferred its real seat (effektiver
Verwaltungssitz)to Germany following the acquisition of all of its shares by German citizens,
constitutes a restriction on freedom of establishment which, in principle, is incompatible

78. See Case C-55/94, 1993 E.C.R. at 1-4165.
79. See Case C-212/97, 1999 E.C.R. at 1-1459. For details of the four-factor test in the context of EC Treaty,
see infra notes 194-197 and accompanying text.
80. SeeJudgmentofMar. 13, 2003, Bundesgerichtshof (Supreme Court), Germany, 49 RIW 474,475 (2003)
("..
weil sic damit in eine andere Gesellschaftsform mit besonderen Risiken, wie z.B. Haftungsrisiken, gedrsngt wird. Eine derartige Verweisung wurde sich ebenfalls als Verstofl gegen die Niederlassungsfreiheit
darstellen..."). Legal commentators share the Supreme Court's view. See infra note 86.
81. See, e.g., Sebastian Gronstedt, BB-Kommentar, 57 BB 2033, 2034 (2002).
82. For a thoughtful discussion of this issue and related problems, see Daniel Walden, Niederlassungsfreibeit,
Sitztheorie
und der Vorlagebescblussdes VII. Zivilsenats des BGH ven 30.3.2000, 12 EWS 256 (2001).
83. Case C-208/00, 2002 E.C.R. at 1-9919. For details of the Uberseeringdecision,see, e.g., Oliver Brand, Das
Kolisinsrecht und die Niederlassungsfreiheitvon Gesellscbaften, 58 JURISTlSCHE RUNDSCHAU [R] 89 (2004); Ebke,
supra note 18; Walter Frenz, Die RechtipersonlicbkeitausiindischerGeselischaften: Sitztbeorie und Niederlassungsfreiheit, 49 GEWERBE-ARCHIV [GtwARcH] 177 (2003); Harald Halbhuber, Das Ende der Simztheorie als Kompetenztheorie: Das Urteil des Europzichen Gerichtshofi in der Rechtssache C-208/00 ((Jberseering), 11 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR
EUROPeISCHES PRIVATRECHT [ZEuP] 418 (2003); Curt C. von Halen, Das internationaleGesellcbaftsrechtnach
dem (berseering-Urtei des EuGH, 57 WERTPAPIER-MITrEILUNGEN [WM] 571 (2003); Karl von Hase, Uberseering
und Inspire Art-EuGHformt dasGesellschaftsrecht der Zukunft, 57 BETRIEB UN5D WIRTSCHAFT [BuW] 944 (2003);
Helmut Heiss, "Uberseering': Klarschiffim internationalenGesellschaftsrecht?,44 ZEITSCHnrr FVO RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG
[ZfRV) 90 (2003); Erich Schanze & Andreas Jiitmer, Anerkennung und Kontrolle auslandischerGesellschaften:Rechtslage und Perspektiven nach der Uberseering-Entscheidungdes EuGH, 48 DIE AKTIENGESELL CHAFT
[AG] 30 (2003); GERAI.SPINDLER &OLAF BERNER, InspireArt-Der euopdische Wettbewerb um dasGesel/schaftsrecht ist
endgiltig eroffnet, 49 RIW 949 (2003); Martin Heidenhain, Auasindische Kapitalgesellchaftenmit Verwaltungssitz in Deutschland,5 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FiOR
GESELLSCHAFrsRECHT [NZG] 1141 (2002).
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with articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty.84 While the European Court of Justice made no
reference to the Jersey decision of the German Supreme Court,"5 there can be no doubt
that the Jersey rule, if applied to companies that can invoke freedom of establishment under
articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty, would be equally incompatible with the corporation's
freedom of establishment guaranteed by articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty.86 Under articles
43 and 48 of the EC Treaty, a Member State is required to recognize the legal personality
of a corporation incorporated in another Member State as provided for by the lerxsocietatis15
The Member State in which the Sister State corporation has its real seat (establishment),
may not disregard the legal personality of that corporation, as provided for by its lex societatis, and substitute it by resorting to local forms of business associations. 8 Although under
the Jersey rule, a foreign corporation, while treated as a Gesellschaft biirgerlichenRechts, may

bring a lawsuit and may also be sued in a German court, the foreign corporation is effectively
deprived of the legal status provided for by the law of its state of incorporation. 9
In light of the Court's holdings in Centros,9° a corporation that is validly incorporated in
an EU Member State enjoys the freedom of establishment guaranteed by articles 43 and
48 of the EC Treaty, even if it never intended to do any business in its state of incorporation,
but was formed in one Member State only for the purpose of establishing itself in a second
Member State where its main, or entire, business is to be conducted. 91 The home state's
requirement that the same company be reincorporated in the country of establishment (real
seat), is tantamount to outright negation of freedom of establishment which, unlike a restriction, cannot be justified in any case under the four-factor test of Gebbard and Centros.92
Thus, the freedom of establishment is triggered by the valid incorporation in any of the
twenty-five EU Member States; provided, the registered office (Satzungssitz) of the corporation is, and continues to be, in its state of incorporation. 9 In light of Centro 94 and
Inspire Art,95 the reasons that a company chooses to be incorporated in a particular Member
96
State are irrelevant to application of the rules on freedom of establishment.
In Uberseering, the European Court of Justice clarified that the exercise of the freedom
of establishment is not dependent upon the adoption of a convention on the mutual rec-

84. Case C-208/00, 2002 E.C.R. at 1-9919.
85. See Judgment of July 1, 2002, supra note 74.
86. See Judgment of Mar. 13, 2003, supra note 80, 49 RIW at 475 (2003). Accord Ebke, supra note 18, at
929; Peter Behrens, Das InternationaleGesellscbaftsrecbtnach dem 7berseering-Urteil des EuGH und den Schlussantrigen
zu Inspire Art, 23 IPRAx 193, 199 (2003); Walter Bayer, Die EuGH-Entscbeidung"InspireArt" und die
deutsche GmbH im Wettbewerb der europdischenRechtsordnungen, 58 BB 2357, 2363 (2003); Marc-Philippe Weller,
Einschrankung der Grsindungstheorie bei missbriuchlicherAuslandsgriindung?,23 IPRAx 520 (2003); Hildegard
Ziemons, FreieBahnfir den Umzug von Gesellschaften nacb InspireArt?!, 24 ZEITSCH Rtr FUR WIRTSCHAFTrsRECHT
[ZIP] 1913, 1917 (2003); Daniel Zimmer, Nach "InspireArt": Grenzenlose GestaltungsfreiheitJirdeutsche Unternebmen?, 50 NJW 3585, 3586 (2003). For the opposite view, see Peter Kindler, "InspireArt"-Aus Luxemburg
nichts Neues zum internationalenGesellschaftsrecht,6 NZG 1086, 1089 (2003).
87. Case C-208/00, 2002 E.C.R. at 1-9970 80.
88. Ebke, supra note 18, at 929.
89. Id. at 928.
90. Case C-212/97, 1999 E.C.R. at 1-1459.
91. Case C-208/00, 2002 E.C.R. at 1-9919.
92. For details of the four-factor test, see infra notes 194-197.
93. For details of the cross-border transfer of the registered office, see infra notes 109-120.
94. Case C-212/97, 1999 E.C.R. at 1-1459.
95. Case C-167/01, 56 NJWat 3331.
96. Id.
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97
ognition of companies within the meaning of article 293 of the EC Treaty. According to
the Court, article 293 of the EC Treaty gives Member States the "opportunity" to enter
into negotiations with a view, interalia,toward facilitating the resolution of problems arising
from the discrepancies between the laws relating to the mutual recognition of companies
and the retention of legal personality in the event of the transfer of their seat from one
9s
Member State to another. Focusing on the "so far as is necessary" clause in article 293 of
99
the EC Treaty and the Opinion of the Advocate General, the Court concluded that article
293 of the EC Treaty does not constitute "a reserve of legislative competence vested in the
00
Member States." The fact that no convention on the mutual recognition of companies
has been adopted on the basis of article 293 of the EC Treaty cannot be used by Member
States to justify limiting the full effect of freedom of establishment guaranteed by articles
0
43 and 48 of the EC Treaty.' ' This holding puts pressure on the EU Council to increase
efforts to harmonize the Member States' laws to facilitate the attainment of freedom of
establishment within the EU. In the words of the Centros Court, "it is always open to the
Council, on the basis of the powers conferred upon it by article 54(3)(g) [now article
' 2
44( 2 )(g)] of the EC Treaty, to achieve complete harmonisation."'

2. Emigration
10 3
In regard to "emigration" or "exit" cases, the European Court ofJustice, distinguishing
Uberseeringfrom Daily Mail, reiterated in Uberseeringits holding in Daily Mail that a Member State is "able, in the case of a company incorporated under its law, to make the com-

97. Article 293 of the EC Treaty provides:
Member States shall, so far as is necessary, enter into negotiations with each other with a view to
securing for the benefit of their nationals:... the mutual recognition of companies or firms within the
meaning of the second paragraph of Article 48, the retention of legal personality in the event of transfer
of their seat from one country to another...
See EC TREAv, supra note 17, art. 293.
The Convention on the Mutual Recognition of Companies and Bodies Corporate of Feb. 29, 1968, did not
enter into force for lack of ratification by the Netherlands. See EDWARDS, supra note 40, at 384. It is highly
unlikely that the Convention will be "revitalized" despite proposals for a "more positive reappraisal" of such a
Convention. See Robert R. Drury, The Regulation and Recognition of Foreign Corporations:Responses to the "Delaware Syndrome," 57 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
165, 194 (1998).
98. Case C-208/00, 2002 E.C.R. at 1-9964 1 54.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 9965 (para. 60).
102. Case C-212/97, 1999 E.C.R. at 1-1493 1 28. For a discussion of the difficulties of company law harmonization in the EU, see GOWER & DAVIES' PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAw 111-14 (7th ed. 2003);

Werner F. Ebke, Company Law and the European Union: Centralized versus DecentralizedLawmaking, 31 LNr'L
LAW 961, 975-84 (1997); Peter Behrens, Krisensyntome in der Gesellscbafsrechtsangleichung,in FESTSCHRiFT FOR
ERNST-JOACHIM MESTMACKER 831 (Ulrich Immenga et al. eds., 1996); Tim Drygala, StandundEntwicklungdes
europaischen Gesellscbaftsrechts, 12 ZEuP 337 (2004); and Jan Wouters, European Company Law: Quo Vadis?, 37
COMMON

MKTr. L. REV. 257 (2000).

103. For a detailed analysis of the controversial subject of the cross-border transfer of a company's seat in
the European Union, see, e.g., Kurt Lipstein, The Law Relating to the Movement of Companies in the European
Community, FESTSCHRIFT FOR ERIK JAYME 527 (Heinz-Peter Mansel et. al. eds., 2004); Eddy Wymeersch, The
Transferof the Company's Seat in European Company Law, 40 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 661 (2003); Marcus Lutter,
The Cross-Border Transfer of a Company's Seat in Europe, 3 EUROPARX-rrSLIG TIDSgitFT 60 (2000); Robert R.
Drury, MigratingCompanies, 24 EUR. L. REv. 354 (1999).
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pany's right to retain its legal personality under the law of that State subject to restrictions
on the transfer of the company's actual centre of administration to a foreign country." 0 4
Despite the general terms in which paragraph 70 of Uberseering is cast, the Court's observation should not be interpreted as suggesting that the Court is prepared to recognize a
Member State as having the power, vis-i-vis companies validly incorporated under its law,
to impose restrictions on the cross-border transfer of the company's actual center of administration, central place of business, or real seat to another EU Member State. In light
of Centros'' and Inspire Art,1 6 it is inconceivable that the Court would construe a corporation's freedom of establishment guaranteed by articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty in the
case of a cross-border transfer of the real seat, principal place of business, or actual center
of administration (emigration or exit case) more restrictively than in an "immigration" or
"entry" case such as Uberseering.1 7 Specifically, the negation by a Member State of the right
of a cross-border transfer of the actual center of administration, principal place of business,
or real seat, and the requirement to reincorporate in the other Member State (i.e., the state
of establishment) would be tantamount to outright negation of freedom of establishment
that articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty are intended to ensure. 08
The cross-border transfer of the registered office (Satzungssitz) is, of course, a different
issue. 109 For such a transfer, a corporation needs to acquire legal personality in the host
Member State and lose it in the home Member State in order to avoid any complications
arising from its registeration in two countries. In light of the holdings of the European
Court of Justice in Centros, Oberseering and Inspire Art, the cross-border transfer of the
registered office is not yet possible within the EU unless secondary community legislation,
such as a coordination Directive under article 44(2)(g) of the EC Treaty, is adopted.' Such
legislation would have to provide appropriate safeguards in the Member States to allow
companies to exercise their freedom of establishment by transferring their registered office,
thereby acquiring legal personality under the law of the host Member State in order to be
governed by that law and without having to be wound-up in the home Member State. The
objective of such a Directive should be to facilitate the cross-border transfer, by way of
freedom of establishment, of the registered office of a corporation already formed under
the law of a Member State.

104. See Case C-208/00, 2002 E.C.R. at 1-9967 70.
105. Case C-212/97, 1999 E.C.R. at 1-1459.
106. Case C-167/01, 56 NJW at 3331.
107. Ebke, supra note 18, at 932.
108. Id.
109. Under the German version of the real seat doctrine, the cross-border transfer of the registered office
of a corporation formed according to German law is not possible without dissolution in Germany; therefore,
the resolution of the general meeting to transfer the registered office cannot be recorded in the home country's
company register (Handelsregister).See Decision (Beschluss) of Feb. 11, 2004, Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht (Bavarian Supreme Court), Germany, 95 GMBH-R NDsCHAU [GMBHR] 490 (2004). For a discussion
of this decision, see Marc-Philippe Weller, Zum identitaswabrenden Wegzug deuescber Gesellscbaften, 42 DSTR
1218 (2004).
110. In Centros, Uberseeringand InspireArt, the registered office of the respective company had remained in
the company's state of incorporation. In its final report of November 4, 2002, the High-Level Group of
Company Law Experts recommended that the EU Commission consider adopting a proposal for a Directive
on the transfer of the registered office. See HIGH-LEVEL GROUP OF COMPANY LAw EXPERTS, REPORT ON A
MODERN REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK FOR COMPANY LAW IN EUROPE at 101 (Nov. 4, 2002), available athttp:/
www.europa.eu.int.
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Recently, the EU Commission outlined the planned proposal for a 14th Company Law
Directive on the Cross-border Transfer of the Registered Office of Limited Companies in
a public consultation.' According to the Commission, each Member State would have to
recognize the right of a corporation governed by its own law to opt, by decision of the
general meeting taken in accordance with the formalities and procedures for altering the
articles of incorporation and the by-laws, to transfer its registered office to anotherMember
State in order to acquire a new legal personality in place of its original one."' The decision
of the general meeting would not, in itself, entail the removal of the company from its
home Member State's register or the loss of its legal personality so long as the company
has not, by virtue of registration in the host Member State, acquired legal personality
there." 3 To protect those who are particularly affected by the transfer, notably minority
shareholders and creditors, the general meeting's decision to transfer the registered office
4
would have to be disclosed publicly in advance, as must its consequences." The home
Member State should also have the power to ensure special protection of the rights of
certain categories of persons, particularly minority shareholders and creditors, in accordance with the principle of proportionality laid down by the European Court of Justice.",
Obviously, the host Member State could not refuse to register a company which, on the
basis of the decision taken by its general meeting and in particular of the changes of its
articles of incorporation and its by-laws, satisfies the essential substantive and formal re6
quirements for the registration of domestic companies." As the EU Commission pointed
out, the Directive should coordinate supervision by the home Member state of the validity
of the decisions taken by the general meeting and supervision by the host Member State
of the substantive and procedural requirements of its own law for the company to be given
"7
Registration in the host Member
legal personality under its law and to be registered.
State should result in the company losing its legal personality and being removed from the
register of its home Member State."' The transfer of the registered office should be re9
corded both in the home state and in the host state." The EU Commission emphasizes,
correctly, that the cross-border transfer of a company's registered office should be "tax-

I11. See EU Commission, Public Consultation relating to the outline of the planned proposal for a 14th
Company Law Directive on the cross-border transfer of the registered office of limited companies, availableat
http://www.europa.eu.int (last visited Sept. 9, 2004).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. Similar protection is already provided for in the context of mergers of corporations by the Third
Company Law Directive (seeDirective 78/855/EEC, Oj. EC [L 2951 at 36 [Oct. 20, 1978]) and in the Statute
Regulation [EC] 2157/2001, Oj. EC [L 2941 at 1 [Nov. 10, 2001] [hereinafter
for a European Company (see
SE Statute]) for the transfer of registered office. As to employee participation rights, the EU Commission
suggests that such rights should be governed by the legislation of the host Member State. Id. "Where they are
more firmly enshrined in the home Member State," the Commission notes, "they should be maintained or
negotiated." Id. According to the EU Commission, the home Member State "could adopt its own rules governing these negotiations where it deems this to be necessary." Id. Obviously, such rules would have to meet
the four-factor test established in Gebbard, supra note 24, and adopted in Centros, supra note 25, for purposes
of articles 48 of the EC Treaty. For the four-factor test, see infra notes 194-197.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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neutral" in accordance with the principles adopted for cross-border mergers by Directive
90/434/EEC. 55
E.

JURISDICTIONAL AND REGULATORY COMPETITION

The significance of Uberseering cannot be overestimated. 2' Oberseering fundamentally
changes conflicts of corporate laws within the EU, especially in Member States such as
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain, that traditionally applied the real seat doctrine to create a level playing field for all corporations
having a substantial nexus with the particular country.'22 Under iberseering, the real seat
doctrine can no longer be applied by a court of any EU Member State to determine the
existence and the legal status of a corporation incorporated in another Member State.
Rather, the legal personality (Rechtsfdbigkeit) of a Sister State corporation is to be determined by way of the law of the state of incorporation. 23 Thus, the level playing field aimed

120. O.J. EC (L 225) at 1 (Aug. 20, 1990). For details of the corporate income tax consequences of a crossborder transfer of the principal place of business or the registered office, see,e.g., Wolfgang Sch6n, Tax Issues
and Contraintson Reorganizationsand Reincorpsrationsin the European Union, 2004 TAx NOTES INTERNATIONAL
197; Dieter Birk, Zuzug und Wegzug von Kapitalgesellschaften:Zu den kbIperschaftsteuerlicbenFolgender Uberseeringentscheidungdes EuGH, 12 INTERNATIONALES STEURREECH [ISTR] 469 (2003); Rainer Deininger, KperschaftsteuerrechtlicheAuswirkungen der Uberseering-Entscheidungdes EuGH, 12 ISTR 214 (2003). For a discussion
of the implications of the holdings of the European Court of Justice in Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillantsee Case
C-9/02, Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant v. Ministhre de l'tconomie, des Finances et de l'Industrie, 2004E.C.R.
__ (forthcoming), availableat http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/archive/2004/c-09420040417en.htnl (last visited Sept. 14, 2004), and reprinted in 57 DB 686 [2004]). For a discussion of corporations emigrating from their
home Member State to another Member State, see Theresa Franz, Beribrt "Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant"die
durch den Wegzug veranlasste Besteuerung von Kapitalgeselschaftenin Deutschland?, 15 EUROPXISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT
FOR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [EuZW] 270 (2004); Jens Kleinert, Endgii/tigesAusftirsteuerlicheWegzugsbescbrdnkun-

gen bei naturlichen undjuristischen Personen, 57 DB 673 (2004); Gerhard Kraft & Marcus Miller, Scblussfolgerungen aus der EuGH-Entscheidung zur franzsischen Wegzugsbesteuerung (Sailant)fir die internationaleSteuerberatungspraxisaus deutscber Sicbt, 50 RIW 366 (2004); Clemens P. Schindler, Hughes de Lasteyrie du Sailanta/s
Ende der (deutscben) Wegzugsbesteuerung?, 13 ISTR 300 (2004); and Franz Wassermeyer, SteuerlicheKonsequenzen
aus dem EuGH-Urteil"Hughes de Lasteyrie du Sailant," 95 GMBHR 613 (2004).
121. The Seventh Chamber of the German Supreme Court implemented the judgment of the European
Court ofJustice in the Oberseeringcase in its final judgment of March 13, 2003. SeeJudgment of Mar. 13, 2003,
supra note 80. For details of this judgment, see Elena Dubovizkaja, "Uberseering'-Recbtsprecbung:Gerichtliche
Kiarstellungzur Niederlassungsfreiheitvon Gesellschaften, 94 GMBHR 694 (2003); Horst Eidenmiiller,Anmerkung,
58 JZ 526 (2003); Stefan Leible & Jochen Hoffmann, "tberseering"und das deutsche Gesel/schaftskollisionsrecht,
24 ZIP 925 (2003); Martin Schulz, (Schein-)Ausandsgesellscbaften in Europa-EinScbein-Problem?,56 NJW2705
(2003); Marc-Philippe Weller, Das InternationaleGeselscbaftsrecbtin der neuesten BGH-Rechtsprechung,23 IPRAx
324 (2003); Johannes Wertenbruch, Der Abschluss des "-berseering'-Verifahrens durch den BGH: Folgerungen,6
NZG 618 (2003).
122. Cf Ebke, supra note 102, at 967 n. 38. The pertinent French principles of conflicts of corporate laws
are thoroughly analyzed in MICHEL MENJUCO, DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET EUROPiENDES sOciTs 13-108 (2001).

123. This view is shared by the vast majority of commentators in Germany. See, e.g., UwE HOFFER, AKTIENGESETZ 17 (6th ed. 2004); Ebke, supra note 18, at 928-29 (with a list of references); Hans Steffen Koch &

Matthias Kungeter, GrenziberschreitendeSitzverlegung von Gesel/scbaften innerhalbder EG-(k)ein Ende der Kontroverse?, 25 JURISTISCHE AUSBILDUNG [JURA] 692, 699 (2003); Marcus Lutter, "Uberseering" und die Folgen, 58

BB 7, 10 (2003); Micheler, supra note 34, at 523-25 & 529; Martin Schulz & Peter Sester, Hkhstrichterlicbe
Harmonisierungder Kollisionsregeln im europdischen Gesellschaftsrecht: Durchbruchder Griindungstheorienach "Uberseering", 13 EWS 545 (2002); Spindler & Berner, supra note 82, at 950. But see also Peter Kindler, Aufdem Weg
zur Europaischen Briefkastengesellschaft?, 56 NJW 1073, 1079 (2003) (arguing that, inspite of Uberseering, EU
Member States are free to apply either the state-of-incorporation principle [Griindungstheorie]or the real seat
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of Justice in Uberat by the real seat doctrine has been replaced by the European Court
4
seering, with a jurisdictional competition among the Member States.1
In the new competitive environment, markets will be making law and setting relevant
26
25
standards' until the EU Council (or others)1 succeeds in achieving what the European
Court of Justice in Centros called "complete harmonization," in particular of the rules re12 7
lating to the structure and organization ("internal affairs") of the corporation. Whether
desirable
even
or
necessary
a complete harmonization of the law of corporations is in fact,
question.
different
a
course,
is,
of
Market
Single
the
European
of
functioning
for the proper
Legislative or regulatory competition, which results from the differences of the laws within
a multi-jurisdictional legal system, may have salutary effects in the market for corporate
8
charters. In addition, it is worth scrutinizing whether, within the EU, company law harmonization, if any, should be achieved exclusively by legislative fiat, or whether harmoni2 9
zation initiated by private actors, such as a European Law Institute, would be preferable.
After Uberseering, the most important questions for legislatures and corporate law scholars,
alike, are how much harmonized company law the EU needs and how much diversity would
30
seem to be desirable for the proper functioning of the Single Market.

doctrine [Sitztbeorie]); Peter Kindler, supra note 86 (arguing that Inspire Art did not address the question of
how the proper law of corporations is to be determined). The Bundesfinanzbof Germany's highest tax court,
has already responded to the holdings of the European Court of Justice in Uberseeringby abandoning the real
seat theory for corporate tax purposes. SeeJudgment of Jan. 29, 2003, Bundesfinanzhof (Supreme Tax Court),
Germany, 94 GMBHR 722 (2003). For a detailed analysis of this decision, see Wienand Meilicke, Die Niederlassungsfreiheit nach "iberseering": Riickblick und Ausblick nach Handelsrecht und Steerrecht, 94 GMBHR 793
(2003); Klaus-R. Wagner, "Uberseering" und Folgenfirdas Steuerrecht, 94 GMBHR 684 (2003).
124. SeeEbke, supra note 18, at 930-31; Horst Eidenmiller, Wettbewerb der Gesellscbafrsrechtsordnungenin
Europa, 50 ZIP 2233 (2002). For an economic analysis of legislative competition in corporation law, seeHEINE,
supra note 3; Christian Kirchner, Zur Okonomie des legislatorischenWettbewerbs im europdischen Gesellschafisrecht,
in FESTSCHRIFT FOR ULRICH IMMENGA 607 (Andreas Fuchs et al. eds., 2004).
125. See Werner F. Ebke, Mdrkte macben Recht-aucb Gesellschafts- und Unternebmensrecht!,FESTScHRIFTFJr
al. eds., 2000).
MARcus LuTrrR 17 (Uwe H. Schneider et
126. For details, see infra note 130 and accompanying text.
127. See Case C-212/97, 1999 E.C.R. at 1-1493 28.
128. For the debate, in the United States, of whether or not states are racing, and whether they are racing
to the top or to the bottom, see infra note 306.
129. For a critical analysis of the predominance of harmonization of private law by way of legislation in the
EU, see JOCHEN TAuPITZ, EuROPAISCHE PRIVATRECHTSVEREINHEITLICHUNG HEUTE UND MORGEN 39-54 (1993);
Ebke, supra note 102, at 984-86; Werner F. Ebke, Ein GeselschaftsrechtfirEuropa?, in AUTBRUCH NACH EUROPA:
75 JAHPE MAX-PLANCK-INSTITUT FOR PRIVATRE CHT 197, 208-13 (Jiirgen Basedow et al. eds., 2001). In the
United States, private bodies such as the American Bar Association (ABA) and the American Law Institute
(ALl) have had considerable influence on the approximation of state laws in general and the law of business
associations in particular. See, e.g., TIM REHER, GESELLSCHArTsPECHT IN GEMEINSAMEN MARKTEN 171 (1997).
The ABA's Revised Model Business Corporation Act (RMBCA) and the ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance support the proposition that private actors may respond faster and more effectively than legislatures
to changing needs of the business community, the financial markets, and society in general. See Ebke, supra
note 3, at 222-23. The same can be said about the Uniform Limited Partnership Act and the Uniform Partnership Act drafted by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law. See id. at 238. In the European
Union, there are no comparable private actors who could successfully launch similar projects in the areas of
company law, securities regulation, and corporate taxation. To remedy the situation, it has been suggested that
a European Law Institute (ELI) be founded to fulfil this task. See Werner F. Ebke, Unternebmensrecbtsangleicbung in der Europdischen Union: Brauchen wir einEuropean Law Institute?, FEsTsCHRii'r FUR BERNHARD GROSSFELD189 (Ulrich Hiibner & Werner F. Ebke eds., 1999). For the role of the High Level Group of Company
Law Experts, see Hanno Merkt, Die Pluralisierungdes europdischen Gesellschaftsrechts,50 RIW 1, 3 (2004).
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IlL. Inspire Art
Even though Uberseeringconcerned "only" the right of a Dutch corporation to be recognized in Germany as a Dutch corporation and the consequential right to participate, as
a Dutch corporation, in legal proceedings in German courts, Uberseering laid the ground
for a much broader application of the freedom of establishment guaranteed by articles 43
and 48 of the EC Treaty."' The recent judgment of the European Court ofJustice in Kamer
van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd.'32 supports this proposition.

A.

PSEUDO-FOREIGN CORPORATIONS

The judgment deals with the Netherlands' Law on Formally-foreign Corporations of
1997.133
1. The Netherlands'Law on Formally-ForeignCompanies
According to article 1 Wet opde FormeelBuitenlandse Vennootschappen (WBFV), the statute
applies to "formally-foreign companies" that are corporations ("capital companies") "formed
under laws other than those of the Netherlands and having legal personality," which carry
on their activities "entirely or almost entirely" in the Netherlands and do not "have any
real connection with the State within which the law under which the company was formed
applies." 13 4 Articles 2 through 5 WBFV impose on formally-foreign corporations various
legal obligations concerning the company's registration as a formally-foreign company in
the commercial register, an indication of that status in all the documents produced by it,
the minimum share capital and the drawing up, production, and publication of annual
financial documents.'l 5 The WBFV also provides for penalties in case of non-compliance

130. See Ebke, supra note 3, at 207-41. See also Friedrich Kfibler, "Legislative Competition" and CorporateLaw
Reform: Some Questionsfrom a European Perspective-Comments,in HARMONIZATION OF LEGISLATION IN FEDERAL
SYSTEMS: CONSTITUTIONAL, FEDERAL AND SUBSIDIARITY ASPECTS

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED

STATES OF AMERICA COMPARED 171 (Ingolf Pernice ed., 1996); Sebastian Mock, Harmonization,Regulation and

Legislative Competition in European Corporate Law, 3 GERMAN L.J. 1 (2002). For an economic analysis of the
subsidiarity principle of EC Treaty, see supra note 17, art. 5(2). See ULRICH B6TTGER, ANSATZE FUR EINE
OKONOMISCHE ANALYSE DES SUBSIDIARITATSPRINZIPS DES

EG ART.

5 ABS. 2 (2004).

131. See Volker Geyrhalter & Peggy G nffler, Perspektiven nach "Lberseering"-wie gebtes weiter?, 6 NZG
409 (2003).
132. Case C-167/01, 56 NJW at 3331. For a detailed analysis of the Inspire Art decision, see, e.g., Christian
Kersting & Clemens P. Schindler, The ECq's InspireArt Decision of 30 September 2003 and Its Effects on Practice,
4 GERMAN L.J.1277 (2004); Peter Behrens, Gemeinschaftsrechtliche Grenzen der Anwendung inldndischen Gesellschaftsrechts aufAuslandsgesellschaften nach InspireArt, 24 IPRAx 20 (2004); Christoph Binge & Ulrich Th6lke,
"Everything goes!"?-Das deutsche Internationale Gesellschaftsrecht nach "InspireArt," 2004 DEUTSCHE NOTARZEITSCHRIFT [DNoTZ] 21; Horst Eidenmiller & Gebhard M. Rehm, Niederlassungsfreiheitversus Schutz des
inliindischen Rechtsverkehrs: Konturen des Europidischen Internationalen Gesellschaftsrecbts, 33 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR
UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [ZGR] 159 (2004); Bayer, supra note 86; Peter Behrens, supra note

86; Volker Geyhalter & Peggy Giinffler, "Inspire Art"-Briekastengesellschafen "on the Move," 41 DEUTsCHES
STEUERRECHT [DSTR] 2167 (2003); Alexander Hirsch, Artfully Inspired-Werdendeutsche Geselschaftenenglisch?,
6 NZG 1100 (2003); Erich Schanze & Andreas Jitmer, Die Entscheidungfur Pluralitdt: Kollisionsrechtund Gesellschaftsrecht nach der Entscheidung "Inspire Art," 48 AG 661 (2003).
133. See Wet op de Formeel Buitenlandse Vennootschappen [Law on Formally-foreign Corporations], of
December 17, 1997, 1997 STAATSBLAO
no. 697 [hereinafter WFBV].
134. SeeWFBV, supra note 133, at art. 1.
135. Case C-167/01, 56 NTJW at 3331 9.23.
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3 6
Article 2 WBFV requires a pseudo-foreign corporation to be regwith those provisions.
137
istered as such in the commercial register in the Netherlands. The company is required
to file a copies of the instrument constituting the company and the articles of association
38
Article 4(4) WBFV provides that directors are
in Dutch, French, German, or English.
jointly and severally liable with the company for legal acts carried out in the name of the
until the requirement of registration in the comcompany during their term as directors
39
mercial register has been fulfilled.
Furthermore, according to article 4(1) WBFV, the subscribed capital of a formally-foreign
corporation must be at least equal to the minimum amount required of limited liability
4
The paid-up share capital
companies incorporated under the law of the Netherlands.
that pseudo-foreign
ensure
to
order
must be at least equal to the minimum capital. In
be filed with the
must
certificate
auditor's
an
requirements,
statutory
the
fulfil
corporations
141
commercial register. Until the requirements relating to capital and paid-up share capital
have been satisfied, the directors are jointly and severally liable with the company for all
legal acts carried out during their term as directors. Article 4(5) WBFV states, however,
that the minimum capital provisions do not apply to a company governed by the law of an
EU Member State or of a Member State of the EEA, to which the Second Directive is

applicable.

42

2. United States of America
The formally-foreign corporation statute of the Netherlands is a classic example of a
state's desire to create special legal obligations for, and to apply specific provisions of, its
corporation law to foreign corporations carrying on most or all of their activities within its
territory. Comparative research has long suggested that the desire of a state to apply specific
local rules to foreign corporations; the business, shareholders, and personnel of which are
predominantly identified with that state, is by no means limited to jurisdictions that have
43
adopted the real seat doctrine. Rather, even jurisdictions such as the fifty states in the
apply the liberal state-of-incorporation doctrine to conthat
America,'
of
States
United

136. Id.
137. Id. at 3331 T 24.
138. Id.
139. Id. 125.
140. Id. T 27.
141. Id.
142. Id. at T 29. According to article 1(1) of the Second Directive, the Directive is applicable to public
companies limited by shares, but not to private limited companies. See Second Directive of Dec. 13, 1976,
1976 OJ. (L 26) 1.
143. GROSSFELD, supra note 43, at 46-50; Grossfeld, supra note 53, at 13; Otto Sandrock, Ein amerikaniscbes
Lehrstickfirdas Kollisionsrechtder Kapitalgesellschaften, 42 RABELSZ 227 (1978). See also DANIEL ZIMMER, INTERNATIONALES

GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 219-40 (1996).

144. In the United States, the existence of a company, as well as its subsequent dissolution, are governed by
the law of the state of incorporation. The same law applies, with rare exceptions, to the "internal affairs" of
the corporation. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 90 (1987) (holding that "[t]he
free market system depends at its core upon the fact that a corporation-except in the rarest situation-is
organized under, and governed by, the law of a single jurisdiction, traditionally the corporate law of the State
of its incorporation") (emphasis added). This rule, known as the "internal affairs rule," means that the relationships between and among shareholders and managers (directors and officers) will be governed by the
corporate law statutes and case law of the state where the corporation is incorporated. See SCOLES, HAY,
BORCHERS &SYMtONIDES, supra note 52, at 1105. Ifa suit raising issues of corporate internal affairs is brought
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flicts of corporate laws sometimes feel a need to apply certain local internal affairs rules to
foreign corporations carrying on most or all of their business within their territory ("pseudo14
foreign corporations").
California is the principal state that has sought to apply specific provisions of its corporation statutes to corporations formed in other states, but whose principal business activities
are in California.'- Section 2115 of California's Corporation Code applies (to the exclusion
of the law of the jurisdiction in which the corporation is incorporated) to corporations with
"specified minimum contacts" in California to comply with designated provisions of the
Code: among others, sections dealing with cumulative voting, directors' standard of care,
indemnification of directors, officers and others, limitations on distributions, inspection
rights of shareholders, and dissenters' rights.14 However, section 2115 does not apply to
corporations with outstanding shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange or the Amer14
ican Stock Exchange or NASDAQ. 1
New York also makes foreign corporations doing business in that state subject to specified
provisions of its Business Corporation Law. 49 New York's statute is less demanding than
California's statute concerning the required contacts with New York,so and also less aggressive in the extent to which New York statutory provisions will apply.' Similar results
as those under statutory regimes may be achieved by means of general principles of
conflicts-of-laws, such as common law outreach rules that some jurisdictions in the United

in a state other than the state of incorporation, the incorporating state's rules will apply and govern the outcome.
See RMBCA § 15.05(c); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302. See generally Richard M. Buxbaum, The Threatened Constitutionalizationofthe InternalAffairs Doctrinein CorporationLaw, 75 CAL. L. REv. 29
(1987); Deborah DeMott, Perspectiveson Choice of Law for CorporateInternalAffairs, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
161 (1985); Phaedon J. Kozyris, Corporate Wars and Choice of Law, 1985 DUKE LJ. 1 (1985). For a thoughtful
analysis of the origins of the internal affairs doctrine in the United States of America, see Richard M. Buxbaum,
The Origins of the American "InternalAffairs" Rule in the Corporate Conflict ofLaws, FESTSCHRIFT FOR GERHARD
KEGEL 75 (Hans-Joachim Musielak et al. eds., 1987). The "external affairs" of a corporation are generally
governed by the law of the place where the activities occur and by federal and state regulatory statutes rather
than by the law of the place of incorporation. See JEFFREY D. BAUMAN, ELLIOT J. WEISS & ALAN R. PALMITER,
CORPORATIONS:

LAW AND POLICY

53 (5th ed. 2003). For a comparative analysis of the law applicable to part-

nerships and their parmers, see DANIEL WALDEN, DAS KOLLISIONSRECHT DER PERSONENGESELLSCHAFTEN IM
DEUTSCHEN, EUROPISCHEN trd US-AMERIKANISCHEN RECHT (2001).
145. Ebke, supra note 40, at 1029-31.
146. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 2004).
147. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 2004). On January 1, 2003, California enacted a new law called
the California Corporate Disclosure Act. The act requires companies incorporated in California, as well as
companies qualified to do business in California, to make an annual filing of certain corporate information
with the California Secretary of State. Among the information that must be filed is information beyond that
contained in the quarterly and annual filings on Forms 10Q and 10K that public corporations must make with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See ROBERT W.
HAMILTON & JONATHAN R. MACEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 249 (8th ed. 2003).
148. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(c)(l)-(2) (West 2004). The section is not applicable if all of the voting

shares of the corporation (other than directors' qualifying shares) are owned directly or indirectly by a corporation or corporations not subject to § 2115. See also CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(c)(3) (West 2004).
149. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1317-1320 (McKinney 2002).
150. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1320(a)(2) (McKinney 2002). Section 1320(a)(1) N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
exempts corporations the shares of which are listed on a national securities exchange from certain provision of
the Law.
151. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1317-1319 (McKinney 2002).
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States apply.' Yet, under the Constitution of the United States, there are limitations on
3
applying local law to the internal affairs of a foreign corporation." The scope of such
constitutional limitations, however, remains largely unsettled.11
3. England
5

England, too, has laws that are explicitly outreaching in order to protect local interests.
Under English law, it is generally recognized today that promoters are free to incorporate
15 6
their business in a country of their choice. However, a foreign corporation having established a place of business in England ("overseas company") is subject to certain obligations
under part XXIII of the Companies Act of 1985.1'" Part XXIII of this act provides an
5 8
effective method of exercising jurisdiction and control over overseas companies. In addition, under section 453 of the Companies Act of 1985, foreign companies carrying on
business in England are subject to the vigorous provisions of part XIV of the Act concerning
the investigation of companies and their affairs (subject to certain exceptions). Furthermore,
under the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, a court may disqualify a director
of a foreign company for up to fifteen years if the company has become insolvent and the
59
director's conduct makes him or her "unfit" to be involved in the management of a company.1
the
of
and
221
220
sections
under
Furthermore, foreign companies may be wound-up

Insolvency Act 1986.

60

Such winding-up triggers, inter alia, the Insolvency Act's provisions

152. For details, seeNorwood P. Beveridge, The InternalAffairs Doctrine: The ProperLaw of a Corporation,44
Bus. LAW. 693 (1989).
153. SCOLES, HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, Supra note 52, at 1112-13 & 1115-16.
154. Wilson v. Louisiana-Pacific Res., Inc., 138 Cal. App. 3d 216, 187 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1982) (upholding the
imposition of the California cumulative voting provisions upon a Utah corporation that was subject to § 2115).
The California shareholders' inspection statute was applied to a foreign corporation in Valtz v. Penta Inv.
Corp., 139 Cal. App. 3d 803, 188 Cal. Rptr. 922 (1983). Cf.Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Superior Court of San
Mateo County, 3 Cal. 4th 459, 472 n. 13, 11 Cal. Rptr.2d 330, 351 n. 13, 834 P.2d 1148, 1169 n. 13 (1992)
(Kennard,J., concurringand dissenting). But see Arden-Mayfair, Inc. v. Louart Corp., 385 A.2d 3 (Del. Ch. 1978),
McDermott, Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206 (Del. 1987), and Draper v. Gardner Defined Plan Trust, 625 A 2d
859 (1993) (holding CAI.CoRP. CODE § 2115 inapplicable under "generally recognized choice of law principles").
155. For a detailed analysis of English conflict-of-corporate-laws principles, see BARBAA S. HrFLING, DAs
ENGLISCHE INTERNATIONALE GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT (2002).
156. DICEY & MORRIS ON THE CONFICTS OF LAWS 1107 (12th ed., 1993); GOWER & DAVIES', supra note 102,
at 103; SCOLEs, HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 52, at 1105; H6FLING, supra note 155, at 122; VOLKER
TRIEBEL, STEPHEN HODGSON, WOLFGANG KELLENTER & GEORG MfLLER, ENGLISCHES HANDELS- UND WIRT-

SCHAFT RECHT 425 (2d ed., 1995).

157. For a comprehensive analysis, see, e.g., GOWER & DAVIES, supra note 102, at 105 -11; H6FLING, supra
note 155, at 161-97.
158. Company law is presently under review in the United Kingdom. See The Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law-For a Competitive Economy, Final Report (July 26, 2001). See also
Jonathan Rickford, Reforming Capital: Report of the Interdisciplinary Group on CapitalMaintenance, 15 Eut. Bus.
L. REV. (2004) (forthcoming).
159. See Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 §§ 1, 6 and 10. For details of thisAct, see, e.g., GowER
& DAVIES, supra note 102, at 212-24; HFLING, supra note 155, at 183-98; Mathias Habersack& DirkA. Verse,
Wrongful Trading-Grundlageeiner europiiiscbenInsolvenzverscbleppungsbaftung?,168 ZHR 174,198 (2004). For
the territorial scope of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 §§ 1, 6 and 10, see Ebke, supra note
40, at 1030 n. 110.
160. For details of the Insolvency Act 1986, see, e.g., H6FLING, supra note 155, at 199-241.
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concerning fraudulent 161 or wrongful trading,161 which, in certain situations, may lead to
personal liability of the directors. 63 By including business associations incorporated abroad
into the ambit of creditor protection and insolvency laws, English law superimposes its
respective laws on foreign corporations and their directors who have taken steps to avoid
local legal controls.

161. See Insolvency Act 1986 § 213, which provides:
(1) If in the course of the winding up of a company it appears that any business of the company has been
carried out with intent to defraud creditors of the company or creditors of any other person, or for any
fraudulent purpose, the following has effect.
(2) The court, on the application of the liquidator may declare that any persons who were knowingly parties
to the carrying on of the business in the manner above-mentioned are to be liable to make such contributions (if any) to the company's assets as the court thinks proper.
For details of Insolvency Act § 213, see, e.g., H6FLING, supra note 155, at 222-24.
162. See Insolvency Act 1986 § 214, which provides:
(1) Subject to subsection (3) below, if in the course of the winding up of a company it appears that subsection (2) of this section applies in relation to any person who is or has been a director of the company,
the court, on the application of the liquidator, may declare that that person is to be liable to make such
contribution (if any) to the company's assets as the courts thinks proper.
(2) This subsection applies in relation to a person if(a) the company has gone into insolvent liquidation,
(b) at some time before the commencement of the winding up of the company, that person knew or
ought to have concluded that there was no reasonable prospect that the company would avoid going
into insolvent liquidation, and
(c) that person was a director of that company at that time.
(3) The court shall not make a declaration under this section with respect to any person if it is satisfied that
after the condition specified in subsection (2) (b) was first satisfied in relation to him that person took
every step with a view to minimising the potential loss to the company's creditors as (assuming him to
have known that there was no reasonable prospect that the company would avoid going into insolvent
liquidation) he ought to have taken.
(4) For the purposes of subsections (2) and (3), the facts which a director of a company ought to know or
ascertain, the conclusions which he ought to reach and the steps which he ought to take are those which
would be known or ascertained, or reached or taken, by a reasonable diligent person having both(a) the general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be expected of a person carrying out
the same functions as are carried out by that director in relation to the company, and
(b) the general knowledge, skill and experience that that director has.
(5) The reference in subsection (4) to the function carried out in relation to the company by a director of
the company includes any functions which he does not carry out but which have been intrusted to him.
(6) For the purposes of this section a company goes into insolvent liquidation if it goes into liquidation at a
time when its assets are insufficient for the payment of its debts and other liabilities and the expenses of
the winding up.
(7) In this section "director" includes a shadow director.
A "shadow director," in relation to a company, is defined as meaning "a person in accordance with whose
directions or instructions the directors of the company are accustomed to act (but so that a person is not
deemed a shadow director by reason only that the directors act on advice given by him in a professional
capacity)."
See Insolvency Act 1986 § 251. For details of Insolvency Act 1986 § 214, see, e.g., H6FLING, supra note 155,
at 225-35; Habersack & Verse, supra note 159, at 182-95.
163. See Insolvency Act 1986 § 213(2), § 214(1) ("contribution order"). For further details, see GOWER &
DAVIES, supra note 102, at 222; Ht6fling, supra note 155, at 229-30; Habersack & Verse, supra note 159, at
195-98.
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4. The Netherlands
In the EU, articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty impose limitations upon a Member State's
power to apply some or all of its corporate law rules upon a corporation formed in another
Member State. The exact scope of such limitations, however, was far from being certain in
1997 when the legislature of the Netherlands enacted the pseudo-foreign corporation statute. 164 To be sure, the Netherlands today follow the liberal state-of-incorporation doctrine. 6' Accordingly, under Dutch conflict-of-corporate-laws rules, the law of the state of
incorporation governs, inter alia, the internal affairs of a corporation regardless of whether
the corporation is a Dutch or a foreign corporation. It became apparent, however, that the
accommodating conflict-of-corporate-laws rules led to increased use of foreign companies
for ends which the Netherlands legislature had not covered, or even foreseen. More and
more frequently, companies that carry on their business principally, or even exclusively, in
the Netherlands were formed abroad (in particular in the United Kingdom and Delaware),
often times with the aim of evading the legal requirements of the Netherlands' company
166
In response, the Netherlands adopted the law on
law for fimctionally similar companies.
17, 1997.167
December
of
pseudo-foreign corporations
As early as October 1999, the Kantongerecht (District Court) of Groningen, in the matter
of Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Groningen v. Challenger Trading Company Ltd.,
68
referred several questions to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. The
Kantongerecbtinquired whether articles 2 tthrough 5 of the Law of December 17, 1997, on
169
formally-foreign corporations were compatible with articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty.
A couple of months after the reference for a preliminary ruling, however, Challenger Trading Company Ltd. was removed from the company register in England, its state of incor70
poration. This change in circumstances technically rendered the questions referred to
7
the European Court of Justice moot. As is well known from Meilicke v. ADVIORGA AG,' '
72
the European Court of Justice is not prepared to rule on hypothetical issues.' As a result,
Inspire Art was to become the seminal case regarding the right of an EU Member State to

164. See supra note 133. For details of this Law, see, e.g., Harm-Jan de Kluiver, De Wet op de Formed Buitenlandse Vennootschappen op de Toebt?, 1999 WEEKBLAD

VOOR PRIVAATRECHT,

NOTARIAAT EN REGISTRATIE [WPNRI

527; Levinus Timmerman, Das niederldndischeGesellschaftsrechtim Umbrucb, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR MARCuS LuTTER 173, 184-85 (Uwe W. Schneider et al. eds., 2000).
165. See, e.g., WOLFGANG MINCKE, EINFUHRUNG IN DAS NIEDERLANDISCHE RECHT 250 (2002); PAuL

GOTZEN,

Niederllindisches Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht 188 (2nd ed. 2000). See also the observation submitted by the
government of the Netherlands to the European Court of Justice in Inspire Art (Case C- 167/01, 49 NJW at
3333 77, referring to article 2 of the Law Concerning the Rules on Conflict of Laws Applicable to Legal
Persons [Wet conflictenrecht corporaties]of Dec. 17, 1997).
166. Case C- 167/01, 49 NJW at 3333 79.
167. For details of the WFBV, see supra notes 133-42.
168. See Decision of Oct. 19, 1999, Kantongerecht (District Court), Groningen, The Netherlands, 11 EWS
280 (2000) (concerning the request for a preliminary ruling by the European Court ofJustice in Case C-410/
99, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Groningen v. Challenger Trading Company Ltd.).
169. Decision of Oct. 19, 1999, at 280.
170. See Ebke, supra note 54, at 644-45.
171. See Case C-83/91, Meilicke v. ADV/ORGA AG, [19921 E.C.R. 1-4871. For the background of this case,
see EDwARDs, supra note 40, at 63-4.
172. From a comparativist's point of view it is interesting to note that the Supreme Court of Delaware
decided the famous case of McDermott, Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206 (Del. 1987), which involves, interalia,the
issue of the constitutionality of California's pseudo-foreign corporation statute, supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text, despite the fact that technically the appeal was moot.
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impose on a pseudo-foreign corporation, incorporated in another Member State, some or
all of its corporate law provisions designed to protect actual or perceived local interests.
The legal, political and economic significance of the central issues in Inspire Art is demonstrated by the fact that the governments of Austria, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and
the United Kingdom submitted lengthy Observations to the European Court ofJustice." 3
B.

THE DISPUTE AND THE REFERENCE FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING

The dispute in the main case arose because Inspire Art Ltd. was not registered in the
Netherlands as a formally foreign corporation. Inspire Art Ltd. was formed on July 28,
2000, in the legal form of a private company limited by shares under the law of England
and Wales.114 Inspire Art has its registered office at Folkestone, United Kingdom. 5 It
conducts business under the business name Inspire Art Ltd. in the sphere of dealing in o0ets
d'art. The company began business in August of 2000, and has a branch in Amsterdam, the
NetherlandsY76 Taking the view that Inspire Art Ltd. should be registered as a formallyforeign corporation, the Chamber of Commerce of Amsterdam applied to the Kantongerecht
(District Court) of Amsterdam on October 30, 2000, for an order requiring Inspire Art
Ltd. to supplement the commercial register with a statement identifying it as a formallyforeign corporation. On February 5, 2001, the Kantongerecht held that Inspire Art Ltd. was
a formally-foreign corporation within the meaning of article 1 of the law.' As to the
compatibility of the Law, the Kantongerecht stayed the proceedings and referred several
178
questions to the European Court ofJustice for a preliminary ruling.
C.

THE JUDGMENT

The holdings of the European Court of Justice in InspireArt are not surprising.

173. Cf Case C-167/01, 56 NJWat 3331.
174. Id. at 3331 1 34.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id., 56 NJWat 3331 (para. 38).
178. Id., 56 NJW at 3331 (para. 39). The District Court referred the following questions to the European
Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
1. Are articles 43 EC and 48 EC to be interpreted as precluding the Netherlands, pursuant to the Wet op
de formeel buitenlandse vennootschappen of 17 December 1997, from attaching additional conditions,
such as those laid down in articles 2 through 5 of that law, to the establishment in the Netherlands of a
branch of a company which has been set up in the United Kingdom with the sole aim of securing the
advantages which that offers compared to incorporation under Netherlands law, given that Netherlands
law imposes stricter rules than those applying in the United Kingdom with regard to the setting-up of
companies and payment for shares, and given that the Netherlands law infers that aim from the fact that
the company carries on its activities entirely or almost entirely in the Netherlands and, furthermore, does
not have any real connection with the State in which the law under which it was formed applies?
2. If, on a proper construction of those articles, it is held that the provisions of the Wet op de formeel
buitenlandse vennootschappen are incompatible with them, must article 46 EC be interpreted as meaning
that the said articles 43 EC and 48 EC do not affect the applicability of the Netherlands rules laid down
in that law, on the ground that the provisions in question are justified for the reasons stated by the
Netherlands legislature?
See id.
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1. Restriction
179
In accordance with its holding in Centros, the European Court of Justice noted that it
of the rules on freedom of establishment,
application
to
the
is "immaterial," with respect
that Inspire Art Ltd. was formed in the United Kingdom only for the purpose of establishing
18
itself in the Netherlands, where its main, or indeed, entire business is being conducted. 0
Kingdom
The Court also noted that the fact that Inspire Art Ltd. was formed in the United
for the sole purpose of enjoying the benefits of more favorable legislation regarding, in
particular, minimum capital and the paying-up of shares, does not mean that a branch of
Inspire Art Ltd. established in the Netherlands, is not covered by freedom of establishment
as provided for by articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty.' The Court acknowledged:

While in this case Inspire Art was formed under the company law of a Member State ... for
the purpose in particular of evading the application of Netherlands company law, which was
considered to be more severe, the fact remains, that the provisions of the Treaty on freedom
of establishment are intended specifically to enable companies formed in accordance with the
law of a Member State and having their registered office, central administration or principal
place of business within the Community to pursue activities in other Member States through
82
an agency, branch or subsidiary.
The Court refused to accept that Inspire Art's freedom of establishment was not in any
3
way infringed by the Netherlands' Law on Formally-Foreign Corporations." The Netherlands argued that, under the Law on Formally-Foreign Corporations, foreign companies
are fully recognized in the Netherlands and are not refused registration in the business
register, and that 184the law simply imposed a number of additional obligations classified as
"administrative."' However, according to the European Court of Justice, the effect of the
law is to apply the Dutch company law rules, in particular, minimum caliital and directors'
liability rules, to foreign companies such as Inspire Art Ltd. that carry on their business
85
activities exclusively, or almost exclusively, in the Netherlands. The Court concluded that
time
of formation and during
at
the
(both
capital
to
minimum
the law's provisions relating
the life of the company) and to directors' liability constitute restrictions on freedom of
8
establishment as guaranteed by articles 43 and 48 of the Treaty. 6The reasons for forming
on its activities excluit
carries
that
the company in the other Member State, and the fact
sively, or almost exclusively, in the Member State of establishment, do not deprive the
company of the right to invoke the freedom of establishment guaranteed by the Treaty,
"save where abuse is established on a case-by-case basis."'
2. Justification
Having concluded that the law's provisions relating to minimum capital and directors'
liability constitute a restriction of the freedom of establishment of Inspire Art Ltd., the

179. Case C-212/97, 1999 E.C.R. at 1-1459.
180. Case C-167/01, 56 NJW at 3331 95.
181. 49 NJPW at 3333 96.
182. Id. at 3334 1 137.
183. Id. at 3333 J 99 ("The argument... cannot be accepted.").
184. Id.
185. Id. 1 100.
186. Id. 1 101 ("The legislation at issue ... has the effect of impeding the exercise by those companies of
the freedom of establishment conferred by the Treaty.").
187. Id. at 3334 T 105. For the question of abuse, circumvention and fraud, see infra note 211 -13.
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European Court of Justice addressed the question of whether there is any justification for
such restriction. 8 '
a. Four-Factor-Test
At the outset, the Court noted that none of the arguments put forward by the Netherlands
falls within the ambit of article 46(1) of the EC Treaty. 1 9 The Netherlands argued that the
Law of December 17, 1997, focused on protecting creditors, combating improper recourse
to freedom of establishment, and protecting both effective tax inspections and fairness in
business dealings. -9The Court's refusal to treat these arguments as falling within the public
policy exception of article 46(1) of the EC Treaty is perfectly consistent with the Court's
case law: article 46(1) has never been a powerful defense in the hands of the Member States
because the Court has always construed the provision very narrowly.191 Therefore, the justifications put forward by the Netherlands were to be evaluated by reference to overriding
reasons related to the public interest. 92 In this context, it is important to note that the
fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the EC Treaty, once viewed solely as safeguards
against discrimination based upon nationality, have developed into solid prohibitions against
national measures liable to hinder, or make less attractive, the exercise of fundamental
freedoms provided for by the EC Treaty. 93 According to settled case law of the European
Court ofJustice, "national measures liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of
fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty" must, if they are to be justified, fulfill four
conditions: (1) they must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner; (2) they must be
justified by imperative requirements in the public interest; (3) they must be suitable for
securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue; and (4) they must not go beyond
what is necessary, in order to attain it.'- The four-factor test was first applied by the European Court ofJustice in Gebbardin the context of article 43 of the EC Treaty. 19 In Centros,

188. Id. at 3334 107.
189. Id. 131. Article 46(1) of the EC Treaty reads as follows:
"The provisions of this Chapter and measures taken in pursuance thereof shall not prejudice the
applicability of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action providing for special
treatment for foreign nationals on grounds of public policy, public security or public health." See EC
TREATY, supra note 17, art. 46(1).
190. Cf.Case C-167/01, 49 NJW at3334 T 132.
191. See Ebke, supra note 65, at643 n. 132. See also
Peter-Christan Mijller-Graff, Article 46 EC Treaty,

Commentary, in VERTRAG UBER DIE EUROPXISCHE UNION UND VERTRAG zuR GRONDUNG DER EUROPXISCHEN
GEmEINscIArr 672 (Rudolf Streinz ed., 2003); Martin Schlag, Article 46 EC Treaty, Commentary, in EUKOMMENTAR 723 (Jflrgen Schwarze ed., 2000).
192. Case C-167/01,49 NJW at 3334 132.
193. For a detailed analysis of the development and its legal significance, see AXEL MOHL, DISKRIMINIERUNG
UND BESCH,,XNKUNG: GRUNDSATZE EINER EINHEITLICHEN DOGMATIK DER WIRTSCHAFTLICHEN GRUNDFREIHEITEN

& Humbolt) (2004). The idea
that articles 43 and 48 of EC Treaty prohibt not
only discrimination based upon nationality but also restrictions of freedom of establishment was advanced as
early as 1987. Werner F. Ebke, Die "auslindischeKapialgeselschaft & Co. KG" und das europidisehe Gemeinschafsrecbt, 16 ZGR 245, 256-59 (1987) (arguing that the four-factor test that was first adopted in the context of
the EC Treaty provisions of free movement of goods and services should also be applied to articles 43 and 48
of the EC Treaty). See also Werner F. Ebke, The Limited Partnershipand TransnationalCombinationsofBusiness
Forms: "DelawareSyndrome" versus European Community Law, 22 IrN'L LAw. 191, 200 (1988).
194. See Case C-167/01, 49 NJWat 3334T 133.
195. See Case C-55/94, 1993 E.C.R. 1-4165 '137. See also
Case C-19/92, Kraus v. Land Baden-Wiirttemberg,
1993 E.C.R. 1-1663 (para. 32).
DES EG-VERTRAGES (Duncker
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the Court extended the test to restrictions on companies' freedom of establishment guar197
196
anteed by article 48 of the EC Treaty, and reconfirmed it in Inspire Art.
While the Court did not engage in a neat factor-by-factor analysis (which it rarely ever
does), it made it clear in Inspire An that the restriction of Inspire Art's freedom of establishment provided for by articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty could not survive scrutiny
9
under the four-prong test of Gebbard and Centros.' 1 The Court left open the question of
whether the rules on minimum share capital constitute an appropriate protection measure.- 9 The Court noted, however, that Inspire Art Ltd. held itself out as a company gov200
erned by the law of England and Wales and not as a Dutch company. Therefore, its
potential creditors are put on sufficient notice that the company is covered by legislation
21
other than that regulating the formation in the Netherlands of limited liability companies.
02
of
Community
rules
to
"certain
Court
pointed
the
in
Centros,
holding
to
its
Referring
20 3
law which protect [potential creditors], such as the Fourth and Eleventh Directives.1
Thus, the Court in InspireArt reiterated its conviction that creditors are best protected by
information and financial disclosure rules. As has been pointed out elsewhere, this holding
constitutes a substantial departure from traditional concepts of Continental legal traditions.
Continental legal systems traditionally have relied heavily on institutional, structural, and
organizational arrangements, rather than information and financial disclosure require2°
It was not until the
ments, to protect the interests of creditors and other stakeholders.
adoption of the Fourth and Eleventh Directive that the idea of stakeholder protection by
means of information and financial disclosure gained widespread acceptance in the EU
20
regarding private companies.
b. Information and Financial Disclosure
By referring potential creditors to information and financial disclosure rules as a means
to protect their own interests, the European Court of Justice sent a strong message to the
Continental EU Member States to reconsider the traditional approach of protecting the
interests of creditors (and other stakeholders) by resorting to rules of corporation law as
opposed to the law of financial disclosure. Relying more heavily on information and financial disclosure would in effect require creditors and other stakeholders to take some measure
of responsibility for their own actions. Creditors in particular can either insist on additional
security (e.g., personal or bank guarantees) or refuse to conclude contracts with a company
2 6
governed by foreign law. " Such a shift with respect to personal perceptions and expectations is essential if the EU is to achieve a body of functionally equivalent (albeit not nec-

196. See Case C-212/97, 1999 E.C.R. at 1-1495 1 34.
197. SeeCase C-167/01, 49 NJW at 3334 133.
135-41.
198. Id.
199. Id. 135.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Case C-212/97, 1999 E.C.R. at 1-1459.
203. SeeCase C-167/01, 49 NJW at 3334 135.
on
Werner F. Ebke, The Impact of Transparency Regulation
note 65, at 646-47. Seealso
204. Ebke, supra
Company Law, in CAPITAL MARKETS AND COMPANY LAW 173 (KlausJ. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 2003);
42 DSTR 232 (2004).
Gesellcbaftsrecht,
im europiiischen
Stefan Grumdmann, Ausbau desInformationsmodells
EDWARDS,
e.g.,
205. For a comprehensive analysis of the Fourth and Eleventh Company Law Directives, see,

supra note 40, at 117-56 & 212-18; MATHIAS IABERSACK, EutRoPXISCHES

GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT

168-83 (1999).

206. Cf Case C-167/01, 49 NJW at 3334 9 125.
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essarily uniform) laws for public corporations, and thereby, to overcome the long stagnation
of the process of company law harmonization.7 This stagnation is due, to a very large
extent, to the fact the many EU Member States have entrusted the law of corporations with
the task of protecting creditors and other stakeholders instead of creating necessary and appropriate protective measures for stakeholders outside the realm of the law of corporations.
In view of the history of company law harmonization in the EU, harmonization efforts
would seem to be more promising if the law of business associations could be freed from
the difficult and controversial task of protecting the interests of stakeholders, such as creditors and employees, and be confined to regulating matters relating to the relationship
between and among the corporation, its managers, and its shareholders (i.e., internal corporate governance).208 The interests of stakeholders, in particular of creditors and employees, could be better served, it appears, by special legislation, which, of course, also needs
to be in compliance with Community law, including the freedom of establishment guaranteed by articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty. 09 A functionally equivalent law of corporations at the Member State level would have to be supplemented, in regard to public
corporations, by a set of European securities and capital market laws designed to enhance
the external governance of corporations and their managers.210
c. Abuse
Like in Centros,2" the European Court ofJustice pointed out in InspireArt that aMember
State is entitled to take measures designed to prevent certain of its nationals from attempting, under cover of the rights created by the EC Treaty, improperly to circumvent their
national legislation or to prevent individuals from improperly or fraudulently taking advantage of provisions of Community Law.2' 12 However, according to the Court, the fact that
a corporation does not conduct any business in the Member State in which it has its registered office and pursues its activities only or principally in the Member State where its
branch is established, is not sufficient to show the existence of abuse or fraudulent conduct
which would entitle the latter Member State to deny that company the benefits of the
provisions of Community law relating to the right of establishment.213 Hence, in light of

207. Werner F. Ebke, Die Zukunft der Rechtsetzung in multiurisdiktionalenRechtsordnungen: Wettbewerb der
Rechtsordnungenoder zentraleRegelvorgabe-amBeispiel des Gesellschafts- und Unternehmensrechts,118 ZETSCHRIFT
FURSCHWEIZERISCHES RECHT [ZSR] 106, 126 (Spec. Issue no. 28, 1999).
208. Ebke, supra note 65, at 647-48.
209. For further details, see infra notes 220-51.
210. See Werner F. Ebke, Unternehmenskontrolledurch Gesellschafter und Markt, in INTERNATIONALE UNTERNEHMENSKONTROLLE UND UNTERNEHMENSKULTUR 7, 28-33 (Otto Sandrock & Wilhelm Jiger eds., 1994).
211. Case C-212/97, 1999 E.C.R. at 1-1459.
212. Case C-167/01, 49 PJW at 3334 136. For details of the doctrine of abuse of Community rights, see,
for example, Holger Fleischer, DerRecbtsmibrauch zwischen GemeinschaftseuropdischemPrivatrechtund Gemeinschaftsprivatrecht,58 JZ 865 (2003); Otto Sandrock, Die Schrumpfung der erlagerungstheorie:Zu den zwingenden
Vorschriften des deutschen Sitzrechts, die ein fremdes Griindungsstatutiiberlagernkonnen, 102 ZEITSCHRIFT FORVERGLEICHENDE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT [ZVGLRWIssI 447, 461-64 (2003); Wolfgang Sch6n, Der "Rechtsmissbrauch"
im EuropaischenGesellschaftsrecht,in FESTSCHR[FT FUR HERBERT WIEDEMANN 1271 (RolfWank et al. eds., 2002);
and Anders Kjellgren, On the Border ofAbuse: The Jurisprudenceof the European Court ofJustice on Circumvention,
Fraudand OtherMisuses of Community Law, 11 EUR. Bus. L. REV. 179 (2000).
213. Case C-167/01, 49 NJW at 3334 T 139. The Court also stated "that the fact that the company was
formed in a particular Member State for the sole purpose of enjoying the benefit of more favourable legislation
does not constitute abuse even if that company conducts its activities entirely or mainly in that second State
Id. at 3333
..
1 96.
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Centros, Uberseering, and Inspire Art, it is virtually impossible to imagine a factual scenario
that would amount to abuse or fraudulent conduct which would entitle a Member State to
deny a company the benefits of the freedom of establishment. According to the Court,
taking advantage of regulatory arbitrage in a single market, is inherent in the exercise of
the freedom of establishment guaranteed by articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty.

IV. Implications
The immediate lesson one can learn from InspireArt is that, within the EU, both capital
requirements and directors' liability are governed by the law of the corporation's state of
14
incorporation. Capital requirements and directors' liability are classic matters of a corporation's internal affairs. In light of iberseering and InspireArt, it is fair to conclude that
all other internal affairs of a corporation that is incorporated in one Member State but
carries on business in another Member State are also governed by the law of the state of
incorporation, its lex societatis. Thus, within the EU, the real seat doctrine has been put to
rest by the European Court ofJustice in regard to corporations formed in any of the twenty215
Yet, even after InspireArt, the question remains whether, and to what
five Member States.
extent, a Member State can take measures to prevent certain of its nationals from attempting, under cover of the rights created by the EC Treaty, to improperly circumvent their
national legislation, or to prevent individuals from improperly or fraudulently taking ad21
vantage of provisions of Community law. 6 As the Court noted in Uberseering, "[iut is not
inconceivable that overriding requirements relating to the general interest, such as protection of the interests of creditors, minority shareholders, employees and even the taxation
authorities, may, in certain circumstances and subject to certain conditions, justify restric21 7
tions on freedom of establishment."

A.

PUBLIC INTEREST

The question just mentioned is of particular interest to many legal scholars in Germany
where the debate between the proponents of the real seat doctrine and the supporters of
the state-of-incorporation doctrine, and the variations thereof, has been particularly passionate and controversial since the 1970s with the rise of brass-plate or mail box companies
8
(Briefkastengesellschaften), domiciled in the Principality of Liechtenstein," and with the
rapid increase in the number of English private limited companies that entered, as the sole

214. Werner F. Ebke, 0berseering und Inspire Art: Auswirkungen aufdas InternationaleGesellschaftsrecht aus
der Sicbt von Drittstaaten,DEUTSCHEs GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT IM WETTBEWERB DER RECHTSORDNUNGEN NACH
CENTROS, UBERSEERING trod INSPIRE ART 101, 108 (Otto Sandrock & Christoph F. Wetzler eds., 2004).

215. Id. at 107. See generally Christian Kersting, Rechtswahlfreiheitim europdischen Gesellschaftsrecbtnacb Uberseering, 6 NZG 9 (2003).
216. SeeCaseC-167/01,49NJWat3334. 136.
217. See Case C-208/00, 2002 E.C.R. at 1-9974 92.
218. See, e.g., GROSSFELD, supra note 43, at 64-7; Werner F. Ebke & Renate Neumann, Anmerkung, 35JZ
652 (1980); Hein K6tz, Zur Anerkennung der Recbtsfdhigkeit nach liecbtensteinischem Rechtgegriindeterjuristisc/er
Personen, 56 GMBHR 69 (1965).
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corporate general partner, into a limited partnership (Kommanditgesellschaft)formed under
19
2

German law.

1. CreditorProtection
In light of Uberseeringand InspireArt, several commentators in Germany recently raised

the question of whether the Member State of establishment is entitled to apply its creditor
protection laws to a corporation incorporated in another Member State if the law of the
state of incorporation provides less stringent rules than the law of the Member State of
establishment.22o Obviously, in most, if not all EU Member States, there is a broad range
of rules that are designed to protect the interests of creditors. Such rules include, but are
by no means limited to, rules relating to the formation and maintenance of a corporation's
capital, 22' piercing the corporate veil, 222 directors' liability for wrongful trading,123 and the

disqualification of directors.224 Such rules may be statutory or judge-made. They may be
part of the law of corporations, the law of insolvency, or even the law of torts. However,
irrespective of how they are treated as a matter of substantive law or for purposes of
conflicts-of-laws,22 s such rules are compatible with freedom of establishment guaranteed by
articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty only inasmuch as the restriction of the freedom of
establishment resulting from such rules in a given case can be justified on the grounds set
forth in article 46 of the EC Treaty22 6 or under the four-factor test of Gebhardand Centros.227
The European Court of Justice has made it clear, both in Inspire Art22s and in Centros,2 2 9
that the answer to the question raised depends on the existence of overriding requirements
230
relating to the public interest.
In view of the holdings of the European Court of Justice in Inspire Art, it is difficult, if

not impossible, to suggest that the restriction of the freedom of establishment resulting

219. For comments in English, see Werner F. Ebke, supra note 193. See also MICHAEL
.AUSLANDISCHE
KAPITALGESELLSCHAFT &

Co.

KG" (1990);

SELLSCHAFT & Co.": ZULASSIGKEIT GRENZUBERSCHREITENDER GRUNDTYPENVERMISCHUNG
GESELLSCHAFITSSTATUTS

UNTER

HAIDINGER,

DIE

HELMuT GROTHE, DIE "AUSLANDISCHE KAPITALGE-

BESONDERER BERUCKSICHTIGUNG DES EUROPAISCHEN

UND ANKNOPFUNG DES
GEMEINSCHAFTSRECHTS

(1989); MARKUS KIESER, DIE TYPENVERMISCHUNG IBER DIE GRENZE (1988); JOACHIM SCHMIDT-HERMESDORF,
AUSL"NDISCHE GESELLSCHAFTER INLNDISCHER PERSONENGESELLSCHAFIEN

(1987).

220. See, e.g., Holger Altmeppen, Scbutz vor "europiscben" Kapitalgesellschaften, 57 NJW 97 (2004); Georg
Borges, Gl/ubigerschutz bei aisliindisckenGesellschaften mit inldndischem Sitz, 25 ZIP 733 (2004); Gerald Spindler
& Olaf Berner, Der GAiubigerscbutz im Gesellschaftrrechtnach InspireArt, 50 RIW 7 (2004); Nikolaus Adensamer
&Cbcile Bervoets, NationalerGliubigerscbutzaufdem PriOitand,2003 RECHT DER WIRTSCHAFT [RDW] 617.
221. Jan Wilhelm, Umagehungsverboteim Recht der Kapitalaujbringung,167 ZHR 520 (2003).
222. See, e.g., GOWER & DAVIES, supra note 102, at 184-90; H6FLING, supra note 155, at 173-83; Habersack
& Verse, supra note 159, at 199. But see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J.CoRP.L. 479
(2001).
223. See supra note 159, and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 162-63, and accompanying text.
225. But see Peter Ulmer, Gliiubigerschutzbei Scbeinauslandsgesellschaften: Zum Verhmlnis zwiscben gliubigerschitzenden nationalem Gesellschafts-, Delikts- und Insolvenzrecbt und der EG-Niederlassungsfreiheit,57 NJVV 1201,
1207-09 (2004); Peter Kindler, Die "Aschenputtel"-LimitedundandereFalle der Mehrfachqualifikationim Schnittfeld des internationalenGesellschafts-, Delikts- und Insolvenzrecht, FESTSCHRIFT FR ERIK JAYME 409 (Heinz-Peter
Mansel et al. eds., 2004).
226. EC TREArY, supra note 17, art. 46. See also supra note 189.
227. For details of the four-factor test, see supra notes 194-197.
228. See Case C-167/01, 49 NJW at 3334 132.
229. See Case C-212/97, 1999 E.C.R. at 1-1495 34.
230. Cf Case C-208/00, 2002 E.C.R. at 1-9974 93.
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from the imposition by the Member State of establishment of its more stringent creditor
protection laws on a corporation incorporated in another Member State, can be justified
on the grounds stated in article 46 of the EC Treaty. In Inspire Art, the government of the
Netherlands tried hard to persuade the European Court of Justice that it could invoke
article 46 of the EC Treaty,"' but it did not succeed. The Court opined that "none of the
arguments put forward by the Netherlands Government with a view to justifying the leg232
islation at issue in the main proceedings falls within the ambit of [ajrticle 46 EC." Similarly, in light of the Court's holdings in InspireAn, one can hardly argue that the imposition
by the Member State of establishment of its own creditor protection laws on a Sister State
corporation can be justified by "imperative requirements in the public interest" within the
33
meaning of the four-factor test of Gebhard and Centros The same is true of the penalties
attached to non-compliance, "that is to say, the personal joint and several liability of direcnational
tors where the amount of capital does not reach the minimum provided for by the
54
amount."
legislation or where during the company's activities it falls below that
2. Labor Representationon the Board
As one should expect, there is an equally controversial debate in Germany relating to the
power of the Member State of establishment to require a corporation that is incorporated
in another Member State, but does most or all of its business in the former Member State,
to adopt certain corporate governance measures, such as the representation of labor on the
board of outside directors (unternehmerische Mitbestimmung or Co-Determination), that
would be applicable if the corporation had been formed in the Member State of establish2 35
ment. Under current German law, the law on labor representation on boards of outside
directors (Supervisory Board or Aufsicbts-rat) of certain large corporations does not apply to
2 36
companies incorporated abroad. According to section 1(1) of the Co-determination Statute of 1976, labor representation on boards of outside directors is required only of certain
companies formed under German law, such as public corporations (Aktiengesellscbaften)and
limited liability companies (Gesellschaflen mit beschrankterHaftung) that meet certain thresh-

231. Cf.Case C-167/01, 49 NJW at3333 -34 $106-30.
232. Id, at 33349 131.
233. For the four-factor test, see supra notes 194-197.
234. Case C-167/01, 49 NJW at 3334 1 141.
235. For details of the current debate, see, for example, FranzJ. Sacker, CorporateGovernance und europdisches
Wege in der Mitbestimmung, 59 BB 1462 (2004); Otto Sandrock, Gebren die deutscben
Gesellschaftsrect: NAeue
Regelungen iiber die Mitbestimmungauf Unternebmensebenewirklic zum deutschen Ordre Public?, 49 AG 57 (2004);
Eberhard Schwark, Globalisierung,Europarecbt und Unternebmenrmitbestimnmungim Konflikt, 49 AG 173 (2004);
Gregor Thiising, Die UnternebmensmitbestimmungundeurapiiischeNiederlassungsfreiheit,25 ZIP 381 (2004); Martin Veit & Joachim Wichert, UnternehmerischeMitbestimmung bei europiiischenKapitalgesellschaftenmit Verwaltungssitz in Deutschlandnach "Uberseering" und "InspireArt," 49 AG 14 (2004); Jens C. Dammann, The Futureof
CodeterminationAfter Centros: Will German Corporate Law Move Closer to the U.S. Model?, 8 FoRtouAm J. CoRP.

& FIN. L. 607 (2003); Abbo Junker, Sechsundsiebzig verweht-Die deutsche Mithestimmung endet in Europa, 57
NJW 728 (2004); and Thomas Miiller-Bonanni, Unternehmensmithestimmungnach "tberseering"und "Inspire
Art," 93 GMBHR 1235 (2003). The most prominent German proponent of the proposition that Germany's
model of labor representation on the board of outside directors of large, public companies is an "outmoded"
concept, is Professor Peter Ulmer of the University of Heidelberg School of Law. See Peter Ulmer, Parititiscbe
Arbeitnebmermitbestimmungim Auflichtsrat von Groftunternebmen-nocbzeitgemdfl?, 166 ZHR 271 (2002).
236. Ebke, Uberseeringund Inspire Art: Die Revolution im Internationalen Gesellscbaftsrecbtund ihre Folgen, in
note
FESTSCHUrr FUR REINHOLD THODE 595, 607 (Rolf Kniffka et al. eds., 2005) (forthcoming); Junker, supra
235, at 729.
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old requirements.237 Sections 76 and 77 of the Act on Work Councils (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) of 1972 take a similar view.23 It is clear from the legislative history of the Codetermination Act of 1976 that the legislature did not wish to apply the principles of labor
representation on supervisory boards to the boards of foreign corporations 23 9 (leaving aside
the "technical" problems that such a requirement would cause if the company in question
had an American-style unitary board of directors rather than a German-style dual-board
structure).2- Under traditional German conflict-of-laws principles, a mandatory rule of
substantive corporation law, which is not intended to be applicable to foreign corporations,
24
cannot be given effect vis-ji-vis out-of-state corporations. '
Consequently, a number of commentators in Germany have argued strongly in favor of
amending the present German Co-determination Act to include corporations incorporated
in another EU Member State that carry on all, or most, of their activities in Germany.242
In order to be legally enforceable, such a rule would have to meet the requirements of
articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty. Clearly, imposing Germany's model of labor representation on a corporation incorporated in another EU Member State would constitute a
restriction of that corporation's freedom of establishment guaranteed by articles 43 and 48
of the EC Treaty because such imposition would hinder the exercise of the freedom of
establishment, or make it less attractive.2 43 It is highly questionable whether application of
Germany's model of labor representation on the board of outside directors of public corporations could be justified on either the grounds set forth in article 46 of the EC Treaty,
or under the four-factor test of Gebhard and Centros, respectively. As co-determination does
not seem to fall within the ambit of article 46 of the EC Treaty, the model would have to
4
be justifiable by "imperative requirements in the public interest."
While some commentators suggest that, in Germany, co-determination is an imperative
requirement in the public interest, with constitutional underpinnings,24 it is clear that the
German way of ensuring labor participation in the supervision and decision-making pro246
cesses of public corporations is not necessarily a reflection of a European public policy.
237. For details of the German law of labor representation on the board, see, for example, Klaus J. Hopt,
Labor Representationon Corporate Boards: Impacts and Problemsfor Corporate Governance and Economic Integration
in Europe, 14 INT'L REv. L. &ECON. 203 (1994).
238. Thiising, supra note 235, at 382.
239. Id.;Junker, supra note 235, at 729.
240. For an early comparative analysis of various board structures, see Grossfeld & Ebke, supra note 54, at
398-409.
241. WERNER F. EBKE, INTERNATIONALEs DEVISENRECHT 135 (1990).
242. Thiising, supra note 235, at 382-87; Marcus Kamp, Die unternehmeriscbe Mitbestimmung nach "Uberseering" und "Inspire Art," 59 BB 1496, 1499-1500 (2004).
243. Ebke, supra note 18, at 931.
244. See supra notes 194-197 ("four-factor test").
245. Dammann, supra note 235, at 641-70; Thiising, supra note 235, at 386-87. But see, Christine Windbichler, Arbeitnebmerinteressenim Unternebmen und gegeniber dem Unternehmen-EineZwischenbilanz, 49 AG
190, 191 (2004) (arguing that labor representation is not an imperative requirement in the public interest);
HUFFER, supra note 123, at 17 (arguing that co-determination is a matter of the nationalordre public) (emphasis
added). For the view of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, Germany's Constitutional Court, seeJudgment of Mar.
1, 1979, Bundesverfassungsgericht (Constitutional Court), Germany, 50 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DEs BUtNDESVERFASSUNGSERICHTS [BVERFGE] 290, 351 (1979) (the Court accepts the argument that labor representation on
the board reflects German public policy "irrespective of its conceptual details").
246. Ebke, supra note 18, at 931. Although several scholars have argued that employees have a moral right
to participate in corporate decisionmaking, others have demonstrated that those claims are untenable. See
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Decisionmaking and the Moral Rights of Employees: ParticipatoryManagement
and NaturalLaw, 43 VILL. L. REv. 741 (1998).
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The recent Directive supplementing the Statute of a European Company (Societas Euro48
47
paea-SE) regarding the participation of employees seems to support this proposi2 49
If it is accurate to assume that the justification put forward by proponents of a
tion.
broader application of Germany's Co-determination Act is to be evaluated by reference to
overriding reasons related to the European, as opposed to a Member State's, public interest,
application of the requirements of Germany's Co-determination Act to corporations that
are incorporated in another EU Member State but do most or even all of their business in
Germany, cannot be justified by "imperative5 0requirements255in the public interest" within the
meaning of the four-prong test of Gebbard and Centros.

B. NON-EU

COUNTRIES

253
22
The question of whether the principles established in Centros, Uberseering,1 and Inspire
254
Art apply, or should be applied, to companies incorporated in countries other than EU
5
Member States is equally controversial. While it has been accepted that freedom of establishment guaranteed by articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty can also be invoked by
corporations formed in any of the Member States of the European Economic Area (i.e.,
56
Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway), the legal situation regarding corporations incor2 57
porated in other countries is far from being certain. This is particularly true regarding
EU Member States that have traditionally applied the real seat doctrine (e.g., Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain). These countries need
to decide whether they wish to continue to apply the real seat doctrine vis-a-vis companies
formed in countries other than EU or EEA Member States, or whether they should turn
to the state-of-incorporation doctrine, possibly subject to overriding principles of their own
law in the case of pseudo-foreign corporations.

1. United States of America
As to corporations incorporated in one of the fifty-four jurisdictions in the United States,
a recent decision of the Eighth Chamber (Zivilsenat) of Germany's Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtsho]) provides some interesting guidance.

247. See SE Statute, supra note 115. For details of the SE Statute in English, see, for example, EDWARDS,
supra note 115, at 399-404; Christoph Teichmann, The European Company-A Challenge to Academics, Legislatures and Practitioners,4 German LJ. 309 (2003). See also CLEMENS P. SCHINDLER, DIE EUROPXISCHE AKTIENGESELLSCH AT

(2002);

GONTER

C. SCHWARZ, EUROPXISCHES GESELLSCHAFTSRECIT 640-704 (2000).

248. Counsel Directive 2001/861E, 2001 OJ. (L 294) 22.).
249. See Horst Hammen, Zweigniederlassungs(reibeiteuropdischerGeselischaften und MitbesimmungderArbeitnehmer aufUnternehmensehene,53 WM 2487, 2494 (1999); Ebke, supra note 18, at 93 1.
250. Case C- 55/94, 1993 E.C.R. at 1-4165.
251. Case C-212/97, 1999 E.C.R. at 1-1459.
252. Id.
253. Case C-208/00, 2002 E.C.R. at 1-9919.
254. Case C-167/01.
255. For details, see Ebke, supra note 214, at 109-28.
256. See Judgment of May 28, 2003, Oberlandesgericht (Court of Appeals), Frankfurt am Main, Germany,
24 IPRAx 56 (2004). For details of this decision, see Carl Baudenbacher & Dirk Buschle, Niederlassungsfreiheit
fitr EWR-Gesellschaften nach Uherseering, 24 IPRAx 26 (2004). See also Peter Mankowski, Entvicklungen im InternationalenPrivat-und Prozessrecht2003/2004 (Teil 1), 50 RIW 481, 483 (2004).
257. Ebke, supra note 214, at 122-28.
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a. Judgment of January 29, 2003
In its judgment ofJanuary 29, 2003,258 the Court held that under the Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation of October 29, 1954, between the United States and the Federal
Republic of Germany,25 9 a corporation that is validly incorporated in the state of Florida
and continues to exist under the law of Florida, enjoys the status of a legal person in
accordance with Florida's law as its lex societatis regardless of where its real seat (effektiver

Verwaltungssitz) is located.2 6 In the opinion of the German Supreme Court, the Florida
corporation could not be deprived of its "legal personality" because, under its Friendship
Treaty with the United States, Germany had assumed the obligation to accord "national
treatment" (Inldnderbehandlung),"most-favored-nation treatment" (Meistbegiinstigung),and

"the right of establishment" (Niederlassungsfreiheit)to companies validly formed in the
United States.6 The German Supreme Court relied primarily upon the second sentence
of article XXV subsection 5 of the Friendship Treaty between Germany and the United
States, which provides: "Companies constituted under the applicable laws and regulations
within the territories of either Party shall be deemed companies thereof and shall have their
juridical status recognized within the territories of the other Party." According to the Court,
this provision requires German courts to apply the state-of-incorporation doctrine (Grindungstheorie), rather than the traditional real seat doctrine (Sitztheorie), to corporations validly formed in the territory of the United States.6s However, at the end of its decision,
the German Supreme Court made a reference to the decision of the European Court of
Justice in Uberseering and pointed out that "the freedom of establishment in particular"
implies the "full recognition of the [corporation's status as a]legal person [Rechtsfdhigkeit]
and the [corporation's] right to sue and be sued [Parteifdhigkeit]."263

There is substantial doubt as to whether the language, the history, the textual position
and the objective of the second sentence of article XXV subsection 5 of the Friendship
Treaty between Germany and the United States sufficiently support the Court's holding.'It has been suggested that, because of uncertainties as to the true meaning of article XXV
subsection 5 of the Friendship Treaty, the provision should be interpreted as adhering to
the real seat doctrine.65 The government of the United States of America may not even
have had the power to alter such rules because the conflict-of-corporate-laws rules are rules

258. Judgment of Jan. 29, 2003, Bundesgerichtshof (Supreme Court), Germany, 57 WM 699 (2003). For a
thoughtful analysis of this judgment, see Guido Jestidt, Anmerkung, 2003 ENTSCHEIDUNGSAMMLUNG ZUM
WIRTSCHAFTS- UND BANKRECHT [(WuB] 635. The same view was expressed by the Eleventh Chamber of the

German Supreme Court in a case involving a New York limited partnership. See Judgment of Apr. 23, 2002,
Bundesgerichtshof (Supreme Court), Germany, 57 WIM 2286 (2002).
259. See 1956 Bundesgesetzblatt (Official Gazette, Germany) II at 487.
260. Judgment ofJan. 29, 2003, 57 WM at 700.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Ebke, supra note 3, at 930; Jestsdt, upra note 258, at 636-37. See generally, Herman Walker, Provisions
on Companies in United States Commercial Treaties, 5 AM. J. COMP. L. 229 (1956). See also Herman Walker,
Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 42 MINN. L. REv. 805 (1958).
265. See Bernhard Grossfeld, Commentary, inJuuus voN STAUDINGER, KOMMENTAR ZUMBiORCERLICHEN
GESETZBUCH MIT EINFUHRUNGSGESETZ UND NEBENGESETZEN: INTERNATIONALES GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 353 (12th
ed. 1981). See also Bernhard Grossfeld & Dorothee Piesbergen, InternationalesGesellschaftsrechtin der Diskussion,
in FESTSCHRIFT FUR ERNST-JOACHIM MSTMXCKER 881, 886-88 (Ulrich Immenga et al. eds., 1996).
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66
of state law rather than federal law.1 It is equally questionable whether the freedom of
establishment provided for in article XXV subsection 5 of the Friendship Treaty of 1954
can be construed as having the same meaning and effects as the freedom of establishment
guaranteed by articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty, and construed as recently as 2002 by
2
the European Court of Justice. 61Nevertheless, following the German Supreme Court's
judgment in the case of the Florida corporation, lower courts in Germany are likely to
adopt the principle that a corporation validly incorporated in any of the states or territories
of the United States will be recognized in Germany as a corporate entity in accordance
with its lex societatis.Thus, unlike corporations formed in certain tax havens (e.g., Cayman
Islands, Channel Islands, Panama, or St. Kitts and Newis), corporations that are validly
incorporated in the USA are not likely to be subject to the Jersey rule.16s

b. Judgment of July 5, 2004
The Second Chamber (Zivilsenat) of the German Supreme Court recently confirmed the
view expressed by the Eighth Chamber. The Second Chamber which generally hears corporate law cases, held in its judgment of July 5, 2004, that the Friendship Treaty between
Germany and the United States requires German courts to recognize the existence and the
legal personality (Rechtfdhigkeit) of a corporation that is validly incorporated in one of the
fifty states in the United States and continues to exist under the law of its state of incor69
poration. Accordingly, the corporation in question which was duly formed in Delaware
but had its principal place of business in Germany was held to have the capacity to par70
ticipate in legal proceedings (Parteifdhigkeit)before German courts. In addition, the Court
applied Delaware law to the issue of whether and to what extent shareholders of the corporation are liable for obligations of their corporation.' However, the Court expressly left
open the question of whether, under the Friendship Treaty between Germany and the
United States, the recognition of an American corporation in Germany depends on existence of a "genuine link" between the corporation and its state of incorporation or other
7
jurisdictions in the United States. Prior to the Court's decision, several German commentators had suggested that the recognition of an American company in Germany depend
on the existence of an effective nexus of the corporation with its state of incorporation or
7
at least with other jurisdictions in the United States." Such a nexus was considered by
these authors to be essential to avoid the rise of pseudo-foreign corporations in Germany.
The Court noted that the proponents of a "genuine link" requirement did not go so far as
to require that the corporation have its principal place of business (effektiver Verwaltungssitz)

266. For a discussion of the question of whether the federal treaty-making power (U.S. Const. art. VI, cl.
2) and the general federal power over "foreign affairs" may place limits on state conflicts-of-laws rules or
supersede it with rules of federal law, see ScoLEs, ET AL., supra note 52, at 218-27.
267. Judgment ofJan. 29, 2003, 57 WM at 700.
268. For details of the Jersey rule, see Judgment of3l. 1, 2002, 151 BGHZ at 204 and accompanying text.
269. Judgment of July 5, 2004, Bundesgerichtshof (Supreme Court), Germany, 59 BB 1868 (2004). For a
detailed analysis of this decision, see Werner F. Ebke, Gesellscbaftenaus Delawareaufdem Vormarscb: Der BGH
__ (2004) (forthcoming).
macbt es moglicb, 50 RIVW
270. J7udgment ofuly 5, 2004, 59 BB at 1868.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. See, e.g., Peter Kindler, Annotation, in 11 M"NCHENER KOMMENTARZUMBGB 83 (Kurt Rebmann et
al. eds., 1999); Carsten T. Ebenroth & Birgit Bippus, Die Anerkennungsproblematikim Internationalen Gesellscbaftsrecbt, 41 NJW 2136 (1988).
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in its state of incorporation. 74 Rather, according to the Court, the majority of the proponents required only that the corporation be engaged "in some kind of business activities"
in the United States, albeit not necessarily in its state of incorporation.2 75 In the case at
hand the Court held that a "genuine link" with the United States "could not be denied"
because the corporation was entrusted with the administration of shares of stock deposited
in Florida. 76 It would have been better if the Court had flatly denied the need for a "genuine
link" under the Friendship Treaty.
c. German Corporations in the United States of America
It is reasonable to assume that the German Supreme Court's ruling in its decision of
January 29, 2003, relating to the Florida corporation that had its real seat in Germany, is
equally applicable to a corporation that is incorporated under German law, but has its real
seat in the United States of America.2 1 7 The requirement that such a corporation reincorporate in the United States would be tantamount to outright negation of freedom of establishment which, according to the German Supreme Court, the second sentence of article
XVV subsection 5 of the Friendship Treaty was designed to guarantee as to corporations
incorporated in either contracting states. From the perspective of conflict-of-corporatelaws rules in the United States, such a corporation would most likely be recognized in the
United States as a corporation and be allowed to do business, subject, of course, to regis278
tration requirements of the state or states in which it wants to do business.
In light of the German Supreme Court's interpretation of article XXV subsection 5 of
the Friendship Treaty, and the Court's reliance upon the interpretation of freedom of establishment by the European Court of Justice, it is not entirely clear; however, whether
and to what extent freedom of establishment as provided for by article XXV subsection 5
of the Friendship Treaty would prevent jurisdictions such as California'" 9 or New York280
from applying their pseudo-foreign corporation laws to corporations incorporated in Germany but having the required contacts with the respective state. As construed by the European Court of Justice in Inspire Art, freedom of establishment guaranteed by articles 43
and 48 of the EC Treaty provides more far-reaching and more restrictive limitations on a
state's right to apply its pseudo-foreign corporation laws to out-of-state corporations, than
does the Constitution of the United States as construed by courts in California.28 If it is
true, as was assumed by the German Supreme Court, that freedom of establishment provided for by article XXV subsection 5 of the Friendship Treaty between Germany and the
United States is to be construed essentially along the lines of the interpretation by the
European Court ofJustice of freedom of establishment guaranteed by articles 43 and 48 of
the EC Treaty, pseudo-foreign corporation laws such as section 2 115 of California's General
Corporation Law or sections 1317-1320 of the New York Business Corporation Act would
not seem to be applicable to German companies carrying on all or most of the business in
California.82
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

Judgment of July 5, 2004, supra note 269, at 1869.
Id.
Id.
Ebke, supra note 214, at 110-11.
Id. at 111-12.
See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
See supra note 154.
Ebke, supra note 214, at 113.

VOL. 38, NO. 3

THE EUROPEAN CONFLICT-OF-CORPORATE-LAWS REVOLUTION

849

2. Switzerland
The legal situation regarding corporations incorporated under the law of other major
trading partners of EU Member States is even less certain. This is particularly true for
2 83
Switzerland, which is not a Member of the EU or the EEA. There is no bilateral treaty
between Switzerland and, for example, Germany that guarantees Swiss companies national
treatment, most-favored-nation treatment, or freedom of establishment in Germany (and
2s 4
vice versa). The impact of the new Bilateral Agreements (Bilaterals I and II) between the
EU and Switzerland on conflicts of corporate laws has not been tested in EU Member
28 s
States or Swiss courts. The relevance of the European Human Rights Convention in this
regard is unclear.86 Article 6(1) of the Convention would seem to require a Convention
State to recognize the right of a corporation validly incorporated in another Convention
State, to have disputes over its contractual and other rights and obligations vis-4i-vis other
287
individuals or companies be heard by an independent court in fair proceedings. However,
the Convention does not seem to require Member States to go beyond the recognition of
the legal status of the corporation in accordance with its lex societatisso as to apply the law
88
of the state of incorporation to the internal affairs of that corporation. Under article 6(1)
of
the corporation in
the
right
to
recognize
a
court
for
it
is
sufficient
of the Convention,
question to bring a law suit or be sued in its own name as a corporate entity, if the law of
89
the corporation's state of incorporation so provides. German constitutional law would
not seem to require that a German court apply the same corporate conflict-of-laws rules
to Swiss corporations as it would if the corporation had been incorporated in an EU or an
EEA Member State, or in the territory of a state with which Germany has a bilateral
international treaty according corporations of either contracting state freedom of estab9°
lishment, national treatment, or most-favored-nation treatment.
9
The Jersey rule established by the German Supreme Court ' would not seem to be
compatible with article 6(1) of the European Human Rights Convention because it does
2
not recognize a foreign corporation's legal status as such.29 Rather, it treats the foreign
corporation as an unincorporated private association (Gesel/scbaft birgerlicben Rechts) that,
2 93
under German law, is deemed to have the right to be a party to legal proceedings. In any

283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.; Wolfgang Wiegand, Die Konsequenzen der Entscheidungen "Uberseering"und "InspireArt"ausderSicht
derSchweiz, 28 MITrrILUNGSBLATr DAV INTERNATIONALER RECHTSVERKEHR [MrrrBL. DAV] 43 (Issue 2/2003).
See generally Anton K Schnyder, Europdisierungdes Internationalen Privat-und Zivilverfabrensrechts. Herausfordeurngauchfir die Scbweiz, FESTSCHRIFT FUR ERIK JAYME 822, 832 -34 (Heinz-Peter Mansel et al. eds., 2004).
286. See Ebke, supra note 214, at 114-15.
287. Id. For a thoughtful discussion of Article 6 of the European Human Rights Convention, see Burkhard
Hess, EMRK Grendrecbte-Cbartaund Eurpiiiscbes Zivilverfahrensrecbt, FESTSCHRIF-r FOR ERIK JAYME 339
(Heinz-Peter Mansel et al. eds., 2004).
288. Ebke, supra note 214, at 115 (with further references). But see Wienand Meilicke, Zur Vereinbarkeitder
Sitztheorie mit der Europiiischen Menschenrechtskonvention und anderem biberrangigemReckt, 50 B 1,8-14 (Supp.
9, 1995) (arguing that art. 6(1) of the European Human Rights Convention requires Member State courts to
apply the state-of-incorporation rule not only to the question of the existence of a corporation but also to the
corporation's internal affairs). See also Wienand Meilicke, supra note 123, at 799.
289. Ebke, supra note 214, at 115.
290. Id. at 115.
291. See Judgment of July 1, 2002, supra note 74.
292. AccordMeilicke, supra note 123, at 799.
293. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
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event, application of the Jersey rule would have devastating effects on a great number of

Swiss corporations that carry on most, or even all, of their activity in Germany. In particular,
it would detrimentally affect the hundreds of Swiss corporations whose only purpose is to

serve as the sole corporate general partner of a limited partnership (Kommanditgesellschaften)
formed under German law, doing all or most of its business in Germany1 94 Such corporate
general partners would be deemed, under the German version of the real seat doctrine, to
have their real seat or principal place of business in Germany, and therefore, would be
treated as an unincorporated private association (Gesellschaft biirgerlichen Rechts) the members of which are personally liable for the association's liabilities.191Consequently, the members would lose the privilege of limited liability that, as a general rule, they would enjoy if
they were treated as shareholders of a Swiss corporation rather than an unincorporated
Gesellscbaft birgerlichen Rechts.296 From a Swiss perspective, such a solution would be ex-

tremely unfortunate, in particular, because companies incorporated in the neighboring
Principality of Liechtenstein (which is known to be home of many brass-plate or mail box
companies) enjoy the privilege of freedom of establishment as Liechtenstein is an EEA
Member State.297 The recent Bilateral Agreements I and II between the EU and Switzerland, arguably will put Switzerland on a par with the Member States of both the EU and
the EEA as far as the freedom of establishment of Swiss companies is concerned.
3. The Future of the Jersey Rule

The future of the Jersey rule is unclear. 98 One should keep in mind that the Jersey rule
was established by the German Supreme Court in an attempt to render the issue in Uberseering moot, and to prevent the European Court of Justice to rule on the politically and
economically controversial issue of whether the real seat doctrine is compatible with freedom of establishment guaranteed by articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty.299 Thus, it is
uncertain whether the German Supreme Court will continue to apply the Jersey rule, even
though other German courts, including the Bayeriscbes Oberlandesgericht,Bavaria's highest
court in civil matters, 00 and the Amtsgericht (Local Court) Hamburg30° have already applied

the Jersey rule to corporations incorporated abroad, but have their real seat in Germany.
The question remains: What, if anything, should replace the Jersey rule?

294. Such combinations of business forms have a long tradition. See, e.g., Herbert Kronke, KG-'ngste
Variante der "ausliindiscbenKapitalgesellscbaft & Co.," 36 RIW 799 (1990); Ralf M. Straub, Beteiligungsverbotaus
Ar. 552, 594 OR fiir eine scbweizerisehe Kapitalgesellschaft als
Komplementir an einer deutscben Kommanditgesellschaft?, 17 IPRAx 58 (1997). See generally supra note 219.
295. See Mark Binz & Gerd Mayer, Die ausliindische Kapitalgesellscbaft & Co. KG im Aufwind?, 94 GMBHR
249 (2003).
296. Id.
297. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
298. SeeJudgment of July 1, 2002, supra note 74.
299. See supra note 75.
300. Decision (Beschluss) of Feb. 20, 2003, Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht (Bavarian Supreme Court),
Germany, 56 DB 819 (2003) (applying the Jersey rule to a corporation having its
registered office in Zambia,
Africa, and its real seat in Germany).
301. Decision (Beschluss) of May 14, 2003, Amtsgeric/t (Local Court), Hamburg, Germany, 23 IRPAx 543
(2003) (applying the Jersey rule to a private limited company incorporated in Cardiff, Wales, that was attempting
to move its registered office to Germany without loosing its corporate status as an English company). For
details of this decision, see Weller, supra note 86, at 521-24.
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In particular, should the principles established by the European Court of Justice in Cen°3
and Inspire Art3° 4 also be applied to corporations incorporated in a
country other than an EU Member State, an EEA Member State, or a privileged Treaty
State, as a matter of policy or for reasons of economic efficiency or transparency? A growing
05
number of commentators in Germany argue strongly in favor ofsuch an approach, although
06
there is also some opposition to such a solution. One author suggests that the problem
be solved by legislation. 07 Those who favor application of the state-of-incorporation doctrine to the internal affairs of corporations incorporated outside the EU, the EEA, or the
territory covered by an international treaty, argue that market transparency requires that
all corporations be treated alike as far as basic corporate conflict-of-law rules are concerned10° Some authors have suggested, however, that as a matter of last resort, courts
could apply overriding principles of domestic law, to pseudo-foreign corporations incor3°9
porated outside the EU, the EEA, or the territory of a Treaty State. Under Continental
conflicts rules, such an approach would only work in practice if the domestic laws in question (e.g., stakeholder protection laws) are designed by the legislature to be applicable not
only to domestic companies, but also to foreign companies.
tros,30 2 Uberseering,

V. Final Oberservations
This article illustrates that the European Court of Justice has fundamentally changed
311
310
corporate conflicts-of-laws in the EU. The Court's judgments in Centros, Uberseering,
and InspireArt" 2 are not revolutionary, but they have revolutionary effects. The judgments
have created not only jurisdictional competition, but also regulatory competition among
the corporation laws of the now twenty-five EU Member States. The three EEA Member
States (Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway) are very likely to become an integral part of
the new competitive marketplace for corporation laws. Other countries, including the
United States, will follow under certain international treaties. The lack of a comprehensive
body of harmonized laws relating to the structure and organization ("internal affairs") of
corporations and other business enterprises in the EU will increase the competition. Several
Member States are in the process of responding to the new challenges caused by Uberseering

302. Case C-212/97, 1999 E.C.R. at 1-1459.
303. Case C-208/00, 2002 E.C.R. at 1-9919.
304. Case C-167/01, 56 NJW at 3331.
305. See, e.g., Eidenmiiller, supra note 124, 23 ZIP 2233, 2244 (2002); Leible & Hoffirann, "iberseering"
und das (vermeintlicke) Ende der Sitztbeorie, 48 RIW 925, 935 (2002); Daniel Zimmer, Grenziiberscbreitende
Rechtspen'nlicbkeit, 168 ZHR 355, 365 (2004) (arguing in favor of "simple and clear rules").
306. See, e.g., Helge Groflerichter, Auslndiscbes Kapitalgesellschaften im deutscben Rechtsraum: Das deutsche
Inteonationale Gesellscbaftsrecht und seine Perspektiven nach der Entscbeidung "lberseering," 41 DSTR 159, 168
(2003) (arguing that for the time being, German courts should continue to apply the real seat doctrine vis-hvis companies incorporated in a country other than Member States of the EU or the European Economic
Area).
307. Mankowski, supra note 256, at 485.
308. See, e.g., Zimmer, supra note 297, at 364.
309. Id.; Behrens, supra note 86, at 205.
310. Case C-212/97, 1999 E.C.R. at 1-1459.
311. Case C-208/00, 2002 E.C.R. at 1-9919.
312. C-167/01, 56 NJW at 333 1.
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and Inspire Art.313 England, once thought by many to be a natural candidate for the position
of Europe's "Delaware,"3' 4 is facing substantial competition. The English law on wrongful
trading' and the Directors Disqualification Act,31 6 are beginning to cause foreign individuals who wish to carry on their activity outside of the United Kingdom to decide against
incorporating their business in England.' 7 Equally or even more accommodating laws such
as the law of Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and maybe even Spain"' and Italy 19 are, for
many, equally or even more appealing than English company law. Small and medium-sized
companies and their legal and tax advisors have also come to realize that incorporating in
another EU Member State can be a costly adventure, leaving aside language, cultural, and
other barriers that continue to exist in the EU. 2° Large corporations, in contrast, have thus
far been rather reluctant to reincorporate in another EU Member State even though there

313. For France, see Patricia Becker, Baldiges neues Grindungsverfahrenin Frankreich:Diefranzsische "BlitzS,4.R.L.," 94 GMRHR 706 (2003). See also Christian Klein, Die EuropdischeAktiengesellschaft "i lafranfaise," 50
R1W 435 (2004).
314. The current role of Delaware in the American market of corporate charters continues to be a subject
of intense scholarly debate in the United States. Some authors argue that Delaware no longer competes, but
has a monopoly. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55
STAN. L. REv. 679, 748 (2002); cf Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, Does the Evidence Favor
State Competition in Corporate Law, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1775, 1820-21 (2002). And, of course, the question remains
whether states, if they compete, are racing to the top or to the bottom. See, e.g., Ralph K. Winter, State Law,
ShareholderProtectionand the Theory of the Corporation,6J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 289-92 (1977); ROBERTA ROMANO,
THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAw 14-24 (1993) ("race to the top"); Robert Daines, Does Delaware
Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J.IN. EcoN. 559 (2001) (yes); cf William L. Cary, Federalismand CorporateLaw:
Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 705 (1974); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalismand the Corporation:The
Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 I-IARv. L. Rev. 1437, 1509 (1992) ("race to the
bottom"). Mark Roe suggests that the debate of whether or not states are racing, and whether they are racing
to the top or to the bottom is misconceived. He argues convincingly that the United States has never had a
"pure interstate race" because of the impact of federal legislation (e.g., federal securities regulation). See Mark
J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARv. L. Rev. 588 (2003).
315. See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
316. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
317. For the advantages and disadvantages of incorporating in the United Kingdom, see Christoph von
Bernstorff, Das Betreiben einer englischen Limited in Deutschland,50 RTW 498 (2004); Jiirgen Gdtz, Multinationale
Konzernstrukturen nach Uberseering und Inspire Art, 2 DER KONZERN 449, 450 (2004); Harald Kallmeyer, Vorund Nachteile der englischen Limited im Vergleich zur GmbH oder GmbH & Co. KG, 57 DB 636 (2004); Alexander
Schumann, Die englisthe Limited mit Verwaltungssitz in Deutschland: Kapitalaujbringung,Kapitalerhaltungund
Haftung bei lnsolvenz, 57 DB 743 (2004); and Thomas Wachter, Auswirkungen desEuGH-UrteilsinSachenInspire
Art Ltd. aufBeratungspraxisund Gesetzgebung: Deutsche GmbH vs. Englischeprivatelimited Company, 95 GMBHR
88 (2004). For the legal consequences if a corporation formed in an EU Member State becomes insolvent in
its host Member State, see Sebastian Mock & Charlotte Schildt, Insolvenz auslandischerKapitalgesellsehaftenmit
Sitz in Deutschland, 6 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR INSOLVENZORDNUNG [ZINsO] 396 (2003; HANs-FRIEDRICH MOLLER,
Insolvenz auslandischerKapitalgeselschafenmit inlandischem Verwaltungssitz, 6 NZG 414 (2003).
318. See, e.g., Nadja Vietz, Die neue "Blitz-GmbH" in Spanien, 94 GMRHR 26 (2003); Nadja Vietz, Verabschiedung des Gesetzes itber die neue "Blitz-GmbH" in Spanien, 94 GMRHR 523 (2003). See also Jens Xagner,
Corporate Governance in Spanien, 50 RIW 258 (2004).
319. See, e.g., Umberto Tombari, The New Italian Company Law: An EmergingEuropeanModel?, FEsTSCHRIr
FOR ERIK JAYME 1589 (Heinz-Peter Mansel et al. eds., 2004); Florian Buenger, Die Reform des italienischen
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may be some advantages or even incentives for managers to do so. It seems that the legal
22
2
and Inspire Art give rise, and the opportunities that these
issues to which Uberseering
judgments seem to offer, are still far from being certain.
Legal uncertainty is not healthy for an economy like the European Single Market that
depends to a very large extent on private investment, private businesses, and cross-border
transactions. It is therefore necessary for all concerned, without delay, to shape the future
law of business associations in the new "right-to-choose-the-proper-law-of-corporation"
23
era in the EU. In this context, it is essential to explore the fundamental question of how
much supranational harmonization of law one needs, and how much legal diversity (and
thus, regulatory competition) one wants in the European Single Market for corporations
24
and other business associations. The debate must be comparative in nature and should
include not only lawyers from European countries, but also American lawyers, as the United
States has a long tradition in dealing with corporate, securities, and tax matters in a multijurisdictional setting. This is not to suggest that one might find final solutions in the United
States for the EU's internal problems, even though the EU and the United States share
2
many of the same values. Comparative analysis will nevertheless be able to assist in providing possible alternatives and ideas for evolutionary developments of the law of business
associations, securities regulation, and taxation in the EU.
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